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The Legislature at War: Bandits, Runaways
and the Emergence of a Virginia Doctrine of
Separation of Powers
MATTHEW STEILEN

This is the story of a banditti that formed in the Virginia Southside during the
early years of the American Revolution. We know little about it. What we do
know comes down to us in fragments of patriot writing, not all of which are
entirely trustworthy. Our banditti was led by Josiah Philips, a “laborer,” writes
Thomas Jefferson, “of daring & ferocious disposition.” He claimed to hold a
military commission from Lord Dunmore, Virginia’s royal governor, to recruit
men into the king’s service. In reality, says Jefferson, he was a brigand. He hid in
the swamps during the day, and at night he emerged, “committing murders,
burning houses, wasting farms, and perpetrating other enormities.” One member of the gang, an escaped slave named Will, was thought particularly fearsome; a local militiaman tells us he struck “terror into the inhabitants of
Norfolk and Princess Anne” counties.1
1. Jefferson to Louis Girardin, March 12, 1815, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson,
Retirement Series, vol. 8, 1 October 1814 to 31 August 1815, ed. J. Jefferson Looney
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Even though we know little about this banditti, how patriot leaders wrote
about it tells us much. The men of the gang met different fates: Philips was
ordered to surrender by the state legislature in an “act of attainder”—more
on this in a bit—and then caught, tried before a jury, and hanged. Will was
shot for a bounty. Other slaves in the banditti were tried and hanged, their
bodies left to decompose “in a conspicuous place.” A jury sentenced one
Jesse Phillpot to die by hanging, but, somehow, he died peacefully 4
years later at home. As Wayne Lee noted in his study of militia in revolutionary North Carolina, “Collective violence, even in the context of war,
responded to social norms of legitimacy.” What norms shaped the patriot
response to the Philips banditti? How did patriots conceptualize the threat
it posed, and how can we relate their views to their treatment of the gang?2
Did law shape the response of Virginia’s leaders? Did the violence patriots used against Philips and his gang respond to legal norms, legal principles, legal understandings? The literature points in different directions. We
know that some commanders in the continental army placed great emphasis on observing modern, reﬁned, humane laws of war. These laws
restricted armed conﬂict to “belligerents” and aimed to prevent violence
from spilling over to the great injury of everyone else. Americans’ observance of the laws of war distinguished them from the British (so they
thought), who punished prisoners, plundered American farms, and even
killed soldiers who did not resist. From today’s perspective, the patriots’
observance of the laws of war appears imperfect, and the conﬂict violent
and disruptive, but the prevalence of law in the writings of patriot commanders is nonetheless apparent.3 Their concern was sibling to a broader

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 334–38 (“daring & ferocious,” “committing murders”); Journal of the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of Virginia; Begun
[. . .] on Monday, the Fourth Day of May, in the Year of our Lord One Thousand Seven
Hundred and Seventy-Eight (Richmond, 1827), 39 (“terror”).
2. Norfolk County Order Book, August 3, 1778 and August 5, 1778, microﬁlm, County
Court Order Books, Library of Virginia (“in a conspicuous place”); Virginia Gazette (Dixon
and Nicholson), March 26, 1779, 2 (Phillpot’s conviction); Virginia Antiquary, vol. 1,
Princess Anne County Loose Papers, 1700–1789, ed. John Harvie Creecy (Richmond,
VA: Dietz Press, 1954), 119 (Phillpot’s death); Journal of the House of Delegates [May
1778], 39, 55 (Will’s bounty); An act to attaint Josiah Philips, in The Statutes at Large;
Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia [. . .], vol. 9 ed. William Waller Hening,
(Richmond, 1821), 463–64; and Wayne E. Lee, Crowds and Soldiers in Revolutionary
North Carolina: The Culture of Violence in Riot and War (Gainesville, FL: University of
Florida Press, 2001), 138.
3. Holger Hoock, Scars of Independence: America’s Violent Birth (New York: Crown,
2017), 17–20, 92–101, 250–68; and John Fabian Witt, Lincoln’s Code, The Laws of War
in American History (New York: Free Press, 2012), ch. 1.
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effort by American elites to obtain international recognition by conducting
government according to a set of conventional legal forms.4 Another body
of scholarly writing, however, treats law as too ethereal and indeterminate
to properly explain patriot behavior, which aimed in fact at status, land, and
power. Blackstone could have skipped his coverage of the law of nations,
writes Eliga Gould, and “just as easily have written that the law was whatever Europe’s rulers said it was.”5 The separation of powers, popular sovereignty—these were ideological ruses used to recruit common men into
the service of the elite, whose only true interest, according to another
writer, was endless land-jobbing.6 As still other studies have suggested,
the “new men” who succeed in pushing their way into the corridors of
power behaved much the same, employing their states’ legislatures to conﬁscate the lands of loyalist neighbors, nearly all of whom were innocent of
any real malum in se. American loyalists were stripped of their civil rights
and property under cover of law. Perhaps, then, we should conclude that
law was merely a tool used to advance other, more basal human interests.7
The problem becomes acute when we turn to men such as Josiah Philips
and Will. Why was Philips’s group a “banditti,” a term typically used
for robber gangs?8 Why not a loyalist “militia,” its members protected
by the laws of war?9 Indeed, why not a revolutionary “committee”?10
4. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, “The Revolutionary Portfolio,” Suffolk University Law Review
47 (2014): 764–70.
5. Eliga H. Gould, Among the Powers of the Earth: The American Revolution and the
Making of a New World Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 5.
6. Alan Taylor, American Revolutions: A Continental History, 1750–1804 (New York:
Norton, 2016), ch. 10.
7. Ruma Chopra, Unnatural Rebellion: Loyalists in New York City during the Revolution
(Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2011), 160.
8. Harry M. Ward, Between the Lines: Banditti of the American Revolution (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 2002), ix–xi.
9. Loyalist militias were not unknown in Virginia. Jacob Ellegood, “a prominent man of
an old, aristocratic Princess Anne family,” earned a captain’s commission from Dunmore
“with authority to enlist one-hundred men.” John Alonza George, “Virginia Loyalists,
1775–1783,” Richmond College Historical Papers 1 (1916): 193. Ellegood was captured,
paroled, and later sent over to the British in a prisoner exchange. H. J. Eckenrode, The
Revolution in Virginia (Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin, 1916), 130, 143. For an account of
how patriots handled loyalist militias and commanders in South Carolina, where the gentry
was politically divided, see Rebecca Brannon, From Revolution to Reunion: The
Reintegration of the South Carolina Loyalists (Columbia, SC: University of South
Carolina Press, 2016), 52, 55, 59, 83.
10. “Committee” could be made to overlap with “banditti,” at least for polemical purposes: “[I]t is the prevailing rage of the present times for people of all ranks, orders, and
professions, to form Associations, and erect themselves into what they call Congresses
and Committees of various denominations . . . [and] in obedience to the orders of such
Congresses and Committees, much private property has been destroyed, the most daring
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Maybe Jefferson found it impossible to believe that a laborer like Philips
was motivated by genuine, independent political attachments, rather than
an interest in plunder. Later, when a patriot militia plundered loyalists in
the southwest part of the state, Governor Jefferson wrote to its gentleman
commander that there would likely be no legal consequences, though he
refused to ratify the conduct. The operative distinction between the two
cases seems to be class.11 Race cleaved the Virginia revolutionary movement as well. Shouldn’t we explain Will’s fate by the fear of slave violence
that was pervasive among Virginia planters? In the Carolinas, as Alan
Taylor describes, “[p]atriots made special efforts to capture and execute
black bandits.”12
This article makes a place for law in the story of the Philips banditti.
Bandits were outlaws, men who habitually failed to heed the law, in a revolutionary society whose fragility made the exchange of allegiance for protection perhaps the most important element of membership. In mid-1775, as
Virginia’s planters tried to rouse the state to resist its royal governor, Philips
led a mob against their efforts, sowing discontent among classes of men
from whom the planters expected (and needed) deference. In 1777 and
1778, he organized some of these men into an armed gang, now accompanied by runaway slaves, and challenged the gentry who led government in
the Southside. When reports emerged that his gang had murdered a militia
captain, the Virginia General Assembly passed a bill accusing Philips of
treason and ordering him to come in for trial or be summarily convicted.
This was the act of attainder.13

piracies and robberies have been perpetrated in the face of open day, and death and destruction denounced against all who dare oppose their lawless banditti. . . .” “For Mr. Rivington’s
New-York Gazetteer,” April 6, 1775, in American Archives, Fourth Series [. . .], vol. 2, ed.
Peter Force (Washington, DC: 1837), 284–85.
11. Jefferson to Arthur Campbell, August 9, 1780, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson,
vol. 3, 18 June 1779 to 30 September 1780, ed. Julian P. Boyd (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1951), 534–35; Woody Holton, Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors,
Slaves and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1999), ch. 6; and Michael A. McDonnell, The Politics of War:
Race, Class, and Conﬂict in Revolutionary Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2010), ch. 4.
12. Philip J. Schwarz, Twice Condemned: Slaves and the Criminal Laws of Virginia,
1705–1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), ch. 6; Alan Taylor,
The Internal Enemy: Slavery and War in Virginia, 1772–1832 (New York: Norton,
2013), ch. 1–3; and Taylor, American Revolutions, 247 (“black bandits”).
13. Ward, Between the Lines, ch. 10; Adele Hast, Loyalism in Revolutionary Virginia: The
Norfolk Area and the Eastern Shore (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press, 1979), 74–85;
and Eckenrode, Revolution in Virginia, 191–92.
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To make a place for law in this story is not to deny that race and class
exerted a profound effect on those involved. Indeed, as we will see, race,
class, and law intersected in the case in insidious ways. But a perception
that the General Assembly had acted rashly or arbitrarily in condemning
Philips arose later. Men’s memories of the case differed from their experiences of it, which, for those leading the revolutionary government, are best
described by what Paul Halliday has called “legal plurality.”14 Legal plurality is an experience of a world as being populated by overlapping, competing legal jurisdictions. It was an experience familiar to British subjects
in the crown’s North American Empire. The act of attainder that the
Virginia General Assembly passed against Josiah Philips was an expression of one such jurisdiction: the jurisdiction of the legislature to do justice
when ordinary forms of law were ineffective, by ordering a dangerous fugitive to come in for trial or stand convicted. Jefferson, who drafted the bill,
had studied this jurisdiction in considerable depth. Class and race played a
central role in his thinking, as they did in the thinking of other Virginia
elites, here as triggers of an extraordinary power. Class and race worked
to foreground the gang’s violence in his mind (“committing murders, burning houses, wasting farms”), and to frame it as a challenge to the very existence of civil government in the Southside.15 As Jefferson knew, these
were the dangers for which legislative legal proceedings had long been
invoked. It is therefore wrong to suggest, as one distinguished historian
has, that Jefferson “could never quite reconcile” himself to the possibility
that “anyone—high ofﬁcial or not—could be tried by an extraordinary
court outside of the regular rules of law.” Some men could.16
This article’s second aim is to explore how this experience of the Philips
case was displaced by a very different memory. It happened that there was
little need for the General Assembly to attaint Philips: before the attainder
could be publicized, he was captured by the Virginia militia, and subsequently tried and convicted of stealing twine and some felt hats.
Ordinary law proved sufﬁcient to punish a man perhaps less “daring &

14. Paul Halliday, “Law’s Histories: Pluralisms, Pluralities, Diversity,” in Legal Pluralism
and Empires, 1500–1850, ed. Lauren Benton and Richard Ross (New York: New York
University Press, 2013), 268–73.
15. On the use of race in the patriot press during the Revolution, see Robert G. Parkinson,
The Common Cause: Creating Race and Nation in the American Revolution (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2016), ch. 3. On the ways in which racial perceptions
worked to divide white and black Virginians, see Philip J. Schwarz, Slave Laws in
Virginia (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press), 30–31.
16. Gordon S. Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 143.
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ferocious” than advertised. This cast the act of attainder as an interference
in the ordinary judicial process. From the perspective of a group of professional, learned lawyers in Virginia, legislative interference in the courts
was intolerable. In the late 1770s and 1780s, these men spearheaded an
effort to reform the state’s courts, extending the methods of professional
lawyers in the central General Court throughout Virginia’s historically
devolved judicial system.17 Jefferson himself championed these reforms.
Although he never ceased defending legislative jurisdiction in the Philips
case, others looking back on the case could not help but see things
differently. If gentlemen sitting in the General Assembly could arbitrarily
interfere with judicial proceedings in (what turned out to be) a serious but
ordinary case, no case would be immune, and such a practice would vitiate
the beneﬁts of professional, learned law.
With the legislature’s assertion of legal jurisdiction impugned, the way
was opened to characterize acts of attainder as an abuse of lawmaking
power, rather than an extraordinary legal power. This is precisely how
St. George Tucker describes the Josiah Philips case in his edition of
Blackstone’s Commentaries, prepared in the early 1790s.18 For Tucker,
the signiﬁcance of the Philips case lay in demonstrating the importance
of a clear, judicially enforceable boundary between the legislature and
courts of law. This would have profound effects on republican government
in Virginia. By refusing to execute backward-looking legislative judgments
that deprived individuals of their lives or property, courts would displace
the assembly, substituting their learned exposition of the constitution for
a paternal decision of the state’s great men that the ordinary course of justice had to give way to preserve the security of their households.19 What
Robert Cover has called the “jurispathic” (law-killing) power of courts
was thus turned inward, toward government, and used to conﬁne the
legal jurisdiction of a superior body, the legislature.20 It is only here, in
17. A. G. Roeber, Faithful Magistrates and Republican Lawyers: Creators of Virginia
Legal Culture, 1680–1810 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981);
F. Thornton Miller, Juries and Judges Versus the Law: Virginia’s Provincial Legal
Perspective, 1783–1828 (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1994), ch. 1;
William E. Nelson, The Common Law in Colonial America, vol. 3, The Chesapeake and
New England, 1660–1750 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 46–52.
18. St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries: With Notes of Reference [. . .], vol. 1
(Philadelphia: 1803), 292–93.
19. On the republican legislature and the household of the Virginia patriarch, see Matthew
Crow, Thomas Jefferson, Legal History, and the Art of Recollection (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2017), 88–89, 105; and Peter S. Onuf, “Making Sense of Jefferson,” in The
Mind of Thomas Jefferson (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2007), 33.
20. Robert Cover, “Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,” Harvard Law Review 97 (1983):
40–44.
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the 1790s, that we see the real beginnings of a Virginia doctrine of separation of powers. The famous provisions of the 1776 Virginia Constitution
separating the departments and their powers must be read with an understanding that the assembly could adjudicate some cases itself, and inﬂuential histories that treat the 1776 provisions in isolation from this practice
need revision.21 Likewise, Jefferson’s oft-repeated complaint, written in
1781 or thereabouts, that the General Assembly had “decided rights
which should have been left to judiciary controversy,” cannot be read to
refer to legislative adjudication per se, which Jefferson defended in the
Philips case, but only to its improper use.22
To get back behind all of this, to understand how elites ﬁrst experienced
the patriot response to the Philips banditti, the story needs to begin at some
remove, to travel some distance into English legal history. This is necessary to get the legal perspective right, which, at least in Jefferson’s case,
was formed by a sustained encounter with a body of texts largely unfamiliar to historians of the eighteenth century. The article then turns to the
opening of the Revolution in Virginia, focusing on the gentry’s experience
of the breakdown of civil government in the Southside and the formation of
the Philips banditti. I consider in detail the legal sources that Jefferson
drew on to decide on the proper legal response to Philips. The last two sections explore how professionalization and court reform led Virginians to
recast the legislature’s involvement in very different terms.

Antecedents: Parliamentary Attainder in England and Empire
Legal proceedings in the English Parliament leave a long trail in books.
Under Edward I there developed a practice of curing injustice by hearing
private petitions in Parliament.23 Bills, which in this period were
21. M. J. C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1965), 119; and Willi Paul Adams, The First American Constitutions: Republican
Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littleﬁeld, 2001), 265. The relevant provisions of the 1776 Virginia
Constitution are section V of the Declaration of Rights, which states that “the legislative
and executive powers of the state should be separate and distinct from the judicative,”
and the Form of Government, which requires that “[t]he legislative, executive, and judiciary
department, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly
belonging to the other.”
22. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, ed. William Peden (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 120.
23. Gwilym Dodd, Justice and Grace: Private Petitioning and the English Parliament in
the Late Middle Ages (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 27–28; and G. O. Sayles,
The King’s Parliament of England (New York: Norton, 1974), 77.

500

Law and History Review, May 2019

imperfectly distinguished from petitions, could also be presented in
Parliament, where they, too, functioned to cure residual injustice, so that
“if redress could not be obtained by a writ, the injured party could claim
the right to go to the king or to the king’s representatives and ask for redress
in their presence.”24 Complaining by petition or bill was less formal than
proceeding by writ original in the common law courts. Plaintiffs had merely
to show, in piteous language, that they had suffered some trespass or loss
that the law could not remedy. Not uncommonly, the wrongdoer was the
king’s own ofﬁcer or commissioner. The prayer worked to align the petitioner with the King, who had sworn to do justice and keep the peace.
Turning to high politics (another, sometimes indistinguishable, aspect of
Parliament’s business), there were similar ideas at work. Country lords
opposed to Richard II lodged an “appeal” in Parliament against his courtiers for traitorously corrupting him. What, precisely, an “appeal of treason” was, we are not entirely certain (they may not have been, either);
but possibly it was meant to invoke a much older, non-common law proceeding, the “appeal of felony,” a kind of private criminal suit heard in the
ancient local courts. Most of the courtiers ﬂed and did not appear in
Parliament to defend themselves, but the “lords appellant” insisted that
the appeal proceed to judgment nonetheless. Common-law courts generally
did not condemn the absent, but under the less restrictive “laws and course
of Parliament,” the lords said, judgment could be entered against the absent
for notorious offenses.25 “Notorious” offenses were particularly heinous
and publicly known, and the principle that they could be prosecuted in
absentia was familiar to students of military and canon law. By asserting
it in Parliament, the lords staked out a summary jurisdiction over state
crimes that could not be punished in ordinary courts.26
24. G. O. Sayles, ed., Select Cases in the Court of King’s Bench under Edward II, vol. IV,
Selden Society volume 74 (London: Selden Society, 1955), lxviii–lxix; and Alan Harding,
“Plaints and Bills in the History of English Law, mainly in the period 1250–1350,” in
Legal History Studies 1972, ed. Dafydd Jenkins (Cardiff: University of Wales Press,
1972), 80. Here Harding is describing bills before the king’s justices in eyre, but he argues
that bills played the same role in Parliament.
25. Chris Given-Wilson, ed., The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, 1275–1594, vol.
7, Richard II: 1385–1397 (London: Boydell, 2005), 100–101.
26. John Collins, Martial Law and English Laws, c.1500–c.1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2016), 18; Kenneth Pennington, “The Jurisprudence of Procedure,” in The
History of Courts and Procedure in Medieval Canon Law, ed. Kenneth Pennington and
Wilfrid Hartmann (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 2016); John M. Collins,
“Hidden in Plain Sight: Martial Law and the Making of the High Courts of Justice,
1642–1660,” Journal of British Studies 53 (2014): 870; and T. F. T. Plucknett, “The
Origin of Impeachment,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fourth Series 24
(1942): 57–61.
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The “bill of attainder” was a natural successor to these constitutional traditions. It expressed the ﬁfteenth century view that in Parliament, the
king’s power was at its greatest, assembled with all his lords and the common of the realm, and that in such an august assembly he might do justice
where other courts, and even his council, could not. Over time, writers theorized this by describing the “King’s high court of Parliament.”27 A high
court could correct failures of justice caused by the limits of inferior courts.
And a high court could concern itself with high politics: matters involving
over-mighty or ungovernable subjects, in which injustice might be too
costly to the realm to leave unaddressed. Proceeding by bill (or, similarly,
by “common petition”) allowed for Parliament to perform these functions:
reciting what was known; calling the defendant (if need be); and resolving
the matter by judgment, ordinance, or act.28 In this way, parliamentary
attainder took its place beside military courts, the King’s Council, justices
of the peace and, somewhat later, the Star Chamber, as a summary legal
jurisdiction employed to manage issues of security, domestic peace, and
police.29
The idea that Parliament was a “high court” proved to have remarkable
staying power, or, at least, to reappear when it most seemed useful and
right. Legal and political texts describe Parliament as a “high court” well
past the English Reformation, when most historians would regard
Parliament as a proper lawmaking body with a permanent place in the
English constitution.30 Seventy years after the Reformation, common lawyers invoked the idea of Parliament as a high court to check abusive
monopolies granted by King James. If exploiting royal monopolies for private gain was, as they believed, illegal, then to adjudicate the grievance in
Parliament it became essential to show that “parliament was not just a legislature; it was also a court and a council.”31 Thus we see the growth of a
number of now-familiar quasi-judicial parliamentary powers, including
powers to summon men and gather papers for investigations, to imprison
for contempt, and to impeach patentees and even ministers for abusing
27. S. B. Chrimes, English Constitutional Ideas in the Fifteenth Century (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1936), 70–85.
28. Matthew Steilen, “Bills of Attainder,” Houston Law Review 53 (2016): 788.
29. Collins, Martial Law and English Laws (military courts), 29–52; John H. Langbein,
Renee Lettow Lerner, and Bruce P. Smith, History of the Common Law (New York:
Aspen Publishers, 2009), 230–36 (justices of the peace), 563–75 (Star Chamber); and
James Fosdick Baldwin, The King’s Council in England During the Middle Ages
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), ch. 11–12.
30. Thomas Smith, De Republica Anglorum (1583), Book II, ch. 1 and 6.
31. Alan Cromartie, The Constitutionalist Revolution: An Essay on the History of
England, 1450–1642 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 191.
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their powers.32 Bills of attainder also found use. Although bills in
Parliament were by then used to pass legislation, the bill power could
also be used for adjudication, and members acknowledged the ambiguity.33
Less appreciated was the exact relationship that these parliamentary proceedings bore to the common law. Which body of law was superior?
Parliamentarians sought to limit the king’s prerogative where it trenched
on common law rights, but then refused such limits in derogation of the
House of Commons’ power to interrogate and imprison. This inconsistency
was not lost on the victims, who pointed out the tension between the House
of Commons’ assertion that its power to arrest for contempt was unreviewable on a writ of habeas corpus, and Paragraph V of the Petition of Right,
which complained of just this practice by the king.34 Bills of attainder triggered a similar difﬁculty, a point that Coke clearly struggles with in his discussion of parliamentary attainder in the Institutes.35
Violent civil conﬂict was thus governed by a host of overlapping legal
regimes, and the management of conﬂicts among these regimes was part
of a collective project of “constitution-making.”36 In England, this project resulted in a decline and then abandonment of attainder for treason
over the 150 years between the Civil War and the end of the eighteenth
century. Impeachments, too, eventually ceased. The causes of this development are complex, but two events stand out. First, a cultural embrace
of the common law in the seventeenth century made the disastrous
attainders of Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, and Sir John
Fenwick appear as exercises of “absolute” or “mere” legislative power,
rather than as summary legal power. Their executions seemed to contemporaries best explained by politics in the council and the House of
32. Edward Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes (London, 1644), 37 (attainder);
J. W. Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1955), 43 (attainder); Stephen D. White, Sir Edward Coke and “The Grievances of
the Commonwealth” (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979) (committee
investigations); and Colin G. C. Tite, Impeachment and Parliamentary Judicature in
Early Stuart England (London: Athlone Press, 1974) (impeachment).
33. For example, the speech of Lord Digby in 1641 during the Strafford attainder:
“[T]here is in Parliament a double Power of Life and Death by Bill, a Judicial Power, and
a Legislative.” John Rushworth, The Tryal of Thomas, Earl of Strafford (London: 1680),
53. Members also debated the use of bills to adjudicate the scope of the sovereign’s prerogative. Cromartie, Constitutionalist Revolution, 191–94.
34. Josh Chafetz, Democracy’s Privileged Few: Legislative Privilege and Democratic
Norms in British and American Constitutions (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2007), 32–37; and Paul D. Halliday, Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 215–19.
35. Coke, Fourth Part of the Institutes, 37; and Steilen, “Bills of Attainder,” 820–22.
36. Daniel Hulsebosch, “Constitution-Making in the Shadow of Empire,” American
Journal of Legal History 56 (2016): 85–86.
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Commons.37 Non-capital prosecutions by bill did persist, but these were
increasingly distinguished by different names, such as the “bill of pains
and penalties.”38 An act of attainder was last used to condemn someone
to death in 1746, following the Jacobite rising, and then only against
those who had ﬂed or were in open rebellion.39 Second, in the early eighteenth century, King’s Bench found success in using prerogative writs
such as mandamus, certiorari, and habeas corpus to police and manage
the conﬂicts among different English jurisdictions, including the special
commissions and similar bodies that were growing into agencies of a
modern administrative state. The court thereby put itself at the center
of English government.40 In contrast, the supervisory and remedial
authority of the Parliament crystalized as a power to constitute courts
and delegate legal power, which it used to confer signiﬁcant discretion
on the council in matters of security and police. Parliament might
make new jurisdictions, or prevent bail by suspending the writ of habeas
corpus, but only the House of Lords could directly exercise legal
power.41
Beyond the realm of England, however, in the provinces of the North
American Empire, the story looks somewhat different. It is well known
that early American assemblies possessed powers of judicature. These
powers were not thought anachronistic or left to lie fallow; lower houses,
in particular, regarded judicature as fortifying the colonial assembly’s
claims to the privileges and status of the great English Parliament.42 In
Virginia, the General Assembly both exercised original jurisdiction in serious criminal matters and acted as a court of last resort.43 Its upper house,
37. Steilen, “Bills of Attainder,” 796–825.
38. Other non-capital punitive bill proceedings included exile and contempt of parliamentary process. William Richard Stacy, “The Bill of Attainder in English History” (PhD diss.,
University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1986), ch. 12–13.
39. Stacy, “Bill of Attainder in English History,” 588, 590. Archibald Cameron, who was
condemned in the 1746 act of attainder, was caught and executed in 1753. Fenwick, however, was likely the last person condemned by an act of attainder in lieu of a common
law trial. Ibid., 589.
40. Halliday, Habeas Corpus, 137–46; and Louis L. Jaffe and Edith G. Henderson,
“Judicial Review and the Rule of Law: Historical Origins,” Law Quarterly Review 72
(1956): 355–64.
41. Paul D. Halliday and G. Edward White, “The Suspension Clause: English Text,
Imperial Contexts, and American Implications,” Virginia Law Review 94 (2008): 616–28.
42. Mary Patterson Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege in the American Colonies (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1943), 54.
43. Warren M. Billings, A Little Parliament: The Virginia General Assembly in the
Seventeenth Century (Richmond: Library of Virginia, 2004), 149, 171; and Scott Douglas
Gerber, A Distinct Judicial Power: The Origins of an Independent Judiciary, 1606–1787
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 50.
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the Council of State, was also the colony’s highest ordinary court, and
councilors amassed perhaps the colony’s greatest collection of law books
at Williamsburg.44 In conducting itself judicially, the council employed
bill proceeding rather than the more formal proceeding by original writ,
and pleading was handled liberally.45 Records suggest that this was by
choice rather than ignorance, as the language implies some familiarity
with the “laws and course of Parliament.” Thus, for example, William
Tiballs and Henry Gee were brought before the council for being “notorious actors, aydors and assistors in the late rebellion,” and banished without
a trial.46 Occasionally, the full General Assembly (Council and House of
Burgesses together) condemned traitors by enactment. For leading a rebellion of planters against Governor William Berkeley, Nathanial Bacon and
his “notorious confederates” were “adjudged to be convicted and attainted
of high treason” “by vertue of this act”—a mixture of judicial and legislative terminology that could have been cut straight from the Parliament rolls
of medieval England.47
These practices change signiﬁcantly in the eighteenth century. Lower
houses and bicameral assemblies lost much of their jurisdiction, which
was delegated to courts of common pleas, quarter sessions, and assizes.48
In Virginia, the British Privy Council replaced the colonial General
Assembly as the court of last resort, although the legislature’s upper
house, the Council of State, did remain the highest ordinary court.49
44. Brent Tarter, “The Library of the Council of Colonial Virginia,” in “Esteemed Bookes
of Lawe” and the Legal Culture of Early Virginia, ed. Warren M. Billings and Brent Tarter
(Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2017), 41.
45. Billings, A Little Parliament, 165–66; and William E. Nelson, The Common Law in
Colonial America, vol. 1, The Chesapeake and New England, 1607–1660 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2008), 37. Liberal pleading should not be taken to imply arbitrary
decision making; as Nelson himself observes, the General Court was outspoken in its
embrace of “rule of law,” partly in an effort to attract settlers to the colony. Nelson,
Common Law, 1:26–28.
46. William Waller Hening, ed., The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of All the Laws
of Virginia [. . .], vol. 2 (New York, 1823), 555 (emphasis mine).
47. Ibid., 2:375.
48. Alison G. Olson, “Eighteenth Century Colonial Legislatures and their Constituents,”
Journal of American History 79 (1992): 566; James A. Henretta, “Magistrates, Common
Law Lawyers, Legislators: The Three Legal Systems of British North America,” in
Cambridge History of Law in America, vol. 1, ed. Michael Grossberg and Christopher
Tomlins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 569–76; and Jack P. Greene,
The Quest for Power: The Lower Houses of Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies,
1689–1776 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1963), 332–33.
49. Leonard Woods Labaree, ed. Royal Instructions to the British Governors, 1660–1776,
vol. 1 (New York: American Historical Association, 1935), 320–21; and Roeber, Faithful
Magistrates, 44, 51.
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Where legislative legal powers grew, they tended to assume a different
form. Some colonial assemblies exercised legal power by superintending
courts of law, overturning their judgments, and “restoring” litigants
thought to have suffered injustice.50 Perhaps the most important legal legislative power in the eighteenth century was the power of the purse. The
core of that power, claimed by the Virginia House of Burgesses, was initiating revenue bills. But control over the purse could entail much else
besides: evaluating and paying claims against the government of the colony, indemnifying ofﬁcers for exceeding the bounds of their power, and
demanding an accounting of expenditures from government. Assemblies
also asserted powers to appropriate tax monies and to audit government
accounts, and (in most colonies, although not in Virginia) occasionally
defunded the salaries of unpopular ofﬁcers, including royal governors.51
In these ways, attending to the purse involved “legislative adjudication,”
as Christine Desan has aptly described it.52
A second development important in Virginia was the rise of the county
justice of the peace, around whom an oppositional, “country” mentality
crystalized in the ﬁrst decades of the eighteenth century. This became perhaps the colony’s most important judgeship. Elite planters used the ofﬁce
to solidify local control over the production and sale of tobacco, the accompanying system of credit and debt, religious conformance, parish management, family, and morality. Most gentleman justices were planters and not
practicing lawyers, although a signiﬁcant number attended one of the
English Inns of Court.53 They coveted law books (there was one in
every planter’s home, even if there was not a Bible), but it was country
50. John Phillip Reid, Legislating the Courts (Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University
Press, 2009): 7–11; and Phillip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2008), 525–32.
51. Greene, The Quest for Power, 51; Evarts Boutell Greene, The Provincial Governor in
the English Colonies of North America (New York: Russell and Russell, 1966), 59–60, 180–
88; Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England
and America (New York: Norton, 1988), 140; and Lucille Grifﬁth, The Virginia House of
Burgesses, 1750–1774 (Birmingham, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1970), 17.
52. Christine A. Desan, “The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in
the Early American Tradition,” Harvard Law Review 111 (1998): 1391–427. A recent treatment of the power of the purse describes how targeted appropriations, auditing, removal,
sunset clauses, and appointment of treasurers gave colonial legislatures signiﬁcant control
over the conduct of government. Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution: Legislative
Authority and the Separation of Powers (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017),
45–77, 92–93.
53. Nelson, Common Law, 3:33–37, 47–52; Roeber, Faithful Magistrates, 34–41, 71–72,
123, table 4; and Gwenda Morgan, The Hegemony of the Law: Richmond County, Virginia,
1692–1776 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989), ch. 2.
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justice manuals that they prized most, rather than the professional lawyers’
Coke on Littleton. A Virginian, George Webb, even wrote a manual for justices of the peace, The Ofﬁce and Authority of a Justice of the Peace
(1736), which circulated widely alongside several English manuals.
Webb declared that his manual “avoided all references to Laws and
Law-Books” beyond those strictly necessary, and that “a true
Judgement” was formed by adapting “General Rules and Maxims” to a
particular case.54 Common law writs and rules of pleading were employed
in civil actions before the justices, empaneled as a “county court,” but the
boundary between their legal and equitable jurisdictions was sometimes
unclear and “the ease of moving from law to equity guaranteed a kind
of informality.” In sum, concludes William Nelson, “Power was exercised
by local elites, who often possessed some training in the law and who ruled
as they thought best.”55
Together, these developments left the legislature’s power to condemn by
bill somewhat uncertain at the time of the imperial crisis. Lawyers were
likely to have heard of attainder, but there was no clear, shared sense of
how to ﬁt this ancient jurisdiction alongside its local, provincial, and imperial competitors.56 As Daniel Hulsebosch, Lisa Ford, and others have
shown, violent conﬂict, particularly on the frontier and at sea, required settlers, traders, indigenous peoples, and imperial administrators to manipulate the overlapping claims of customary law, admiralty, and the
common law. In the Virginia Tidewater, too, imperial and local legal
regimes could overlap to upset the expectations of the gentry and the people they kept as slaves. A justice of the peace faced with a runaway slave,
alleged to have a committed an offense during a time of war, had ﬁrst to
settle on the law, a decision that could mean the difference between a
54. Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia: 1740–1790 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1982), 92–93, 133; Warren M. Billings, “English Legal Literature
as a Source of Law and Practice in Seventeenth Century Virginia,” in Billings and Tarter,
“Esteemed Bookes of Lawe”, 19–21; Louis B. Wright, The First Gentlemen of Virginia
(San Marino, CA: The Huntington Library, 1940), 123–33; Roeber, Faithful Magistrates,
56–59; George Webb, The Ofﬁce and Authority of a Justice of the Peace (Williamsburg:
1736), ix; and Miller, Juries and Judges, 6.
55. Roeber, Faithful Magistrates, 44 (“ease of moving”); Nelson, Common Law, 3:43–45,
49–50; R. T. Barton, “Introduction,” in John Randolph and Edward Barradall, Virginia
Colonial Decisions, vol. 1, ed. R. T. Barton (Boston: Boston Book, 1909), 198–99. A
study of the Norfolk County Court and the Norfolk Borough Hustings Court states that
the courts “seemed to follow rules strictly, though perhaps not always to the detriment of
litigants. They seemed comfortable with familiar rules and forms.” E. Lee Shepard, “The
Administration of Justice in Revolutionary Virginia: The Norfolk Courts, 1770–1790” (master’s thesis, University of Virginia, 1974), 17.
56. Steilen, “Bills of Attainder,” 772–73, 826–31.
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sentence of whipping, hard labor, exile, death, transfer to another court, or
“release” to the patriarchal discipline of the master.57
Understanding how Virginians tried to answer these questions requires a
sense of the cases in which the questions were presented. We are searching
for how men thought about those cases, how they approached them, and
how they conceived of the problems and the people involved. What did
Virginia gentlemen see when they looked at Josiah Philips and his
gang? To what body of law did their perceptions point?
Discontent and the Opening of War in the Tidewater
Josiah Philips was a laborer who lived in Lynnhaven Parish, in Princess
Anne County, an area now part of Virginia Beach. In the late summer of
1775 he came to the attention of the volunteer militia companies then lingering in the heat at Williamsburg. George Gilmer, Thomas Jefferson’s
close friend and commander of a volunteer company from Albemarle
County, recorded the observation in his diary, which he used to document
the companies’ activities and their ofﬁcers’ correspondence with the Third
Virginia Convention, then in session. “It is certain,” Gilmer wrote, “that
one Phillips commands an Ignorant disorderly mob who are in direct opposition to our plan.”58 What “plan” he meant is not immediately clear.59
Two days later, the clerk of the convention, John Tazewell, entered the
57. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire: New York and the Transformation of
Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1664–1830 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2005), 42–104; Lisa Ford, Settler Sovereignty, Jurisdiction and
Indigenous People in America and Australia, 1788–1836 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2010), 3–24; Gould, Among the Powers of the Earth, ch. 1; and David
Thomas Konig, “Virginia and the Imperial State: Law, Enlightenment, and ‘The Crooked
Cord of Discretion,’” in The British and their Laws in the Eighteenth Century, ed. David
Lemmings (Suffolk: Woodbridge, 2005), 220. For an extension of these issues to the
1780s and the framing of the federal Constitution, see Gregory Ablavsky, “The Savage
Constitution,” Duke Law Journal 63 (2014): 1009–18.
58. George Gilmer, Commonplace Book, August 1, 1775, p. 65, Mss 5: 5 G4231:1,
Virginia Historical Society; and Robert L. Scribner, ed., Revolutionary Virginia, The
Road to Independence, vol. 3, The Breaking Storm and the Third Convention, 1775
(Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1977), 385, 388 n.23.
59. Gilmer “was a leader of the activists” among the volunteer companies’ ofﬁcers, and it
was he who proposed that the companies seize public moneys in the name of the convention.
Courtlandt Canby, “The Commonplace Book of Doctor George Gilmer,” Virginia Magazine
of History and Biography 56 (1948): 383. By August 1, that plan had already come to
naught, as the convention resolved that the “proceedings of the Volunteer Companies . . .
cannot be approved, and that they be requested to desist from carrying their resolution
into action. [signed] A Copy John Tazewell Clerk of the Convention.” Gilmer,
Commonplace Book, 62.
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ofﬁcers’ minutes in the Convention Proceedings. Tazewell described
Philips as opposed “the measures of this Country,” that is, Virginia. But
which ones?60
At the time, the Third Convention was occupied largely with military
preparations. In late July it had provided for raising two regiments of regulars and 8,000 militiamen, to be paid for their service in paper notes. The
law exempted men from militia duty if they owned four or more slaves, and
gentlemen accepting an ofﬁcer’s commission drew pay more than ten times
that of the enlisted, causing a resentment that Woody Holton has described
as “emerging class consciousness.”61 In early spring, the Second Virginia
Convention had recommended that county committees “collect from their
constituents, so much money, as will be sufﬁcient,” to purchase gunpowder, lead and ﬂint, a levy to be apportioned “as the committee shall judge
requisite.”62 This measure, too, caused discontent. Why shouldn’t wealthy
ofﬁcers provide the muskets and powder? Alexander Miller thought it
unfair, and announced the planter class “would take every half-bitt they
had” to “mak[e] gentlemen of themselves.” As a loyalist later explained,
describing the hundreds who lined up to swear loyalty to the king after
the British victory at Kemp’s Landing, “poor people blame these men
[i.e., patriots] for obliging them to take up arms.”63 To hear such views
expressed in public, in open deﬁance of the convention and the county
committees, caused Virginia’s great men worry. Writing to Edmund
Pendleton about such a case, John Richards could hardly believe it.
“[O]ur cause is too good to be prejudiced by any person of his

60. Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 3:393.
61. An ordinance for raising and embodying a sufﬁcient force, for the defense and protection of this colony, in Hening, Statutes at Large, 9:9–34; and Holton, Forced Founders, 168.
The pay differential between ofﬁcers and enlisted men was greater in the Southern colonies
than in the North, whose armies at ﬁrst aimed to embody Whig principles of equality. When
George Washington assumed control of the New England Army (which became the
Continental Army), eliminating pay equality was one of his chief goals. Jerrilyn Greene
Marston, King and Congress: The Transfer of Political Legitimacy, 1774–1776
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 150, 158–64.
62. The Proceedings of the Convention of Delegates [. . .] March, 1775 (Richmond:
1816), 6–7. The matter was felt urgent after Governor Dunmore emptied the
Williamsburg magazine of powder in late April. See, for example, the Resolution of the
Gloucester County Committee, April 25, 1775, in Force, American Archives Fourth
Series, 2:387–88.
63. Virginia Gazette (Purdie), November 3, 1775 (“every half-bitt they had”); Neil
Jamieson to Messrs. Glassford, Gordon, Monteath, and Co., November 17, 1775, in
Revolutionary Virginia: The Road to Independence, vol. 4, The Committee of Safety and
the Balance of Forces, ed. Robert L. Scribner and Brent Tarter (Charlottesville, VA:
University of Virginia Press, 1978), 423.
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Insigniﬁcancy.” The man had always been “very Industrious, Quiet & saying little to any person.”64
The continental agreement to stop the importation of British goods was
meeting increased resistance as well. In Virginia, implementation fell to the
gentlemen of the revolutionary county committees, and Lingley tells us
that the Norfolk County Committee was dutifully “industrious” in enforcing the rules. Yet the weight of the policy was unevenly borne. Banning
imports hurt the county’s merchants, who were unable to conduct much
of their business. Some understandably expressed a desire for Virginia to
remain neutral in the dispute or even for the colonies to acquiesce.65
Landless farmers, laborers, pilots, and mechanics also saw their incomes
decline, and, lacking cash reserves, struggled to pay their rent. This was
a signiﬁcant population: the landless comprised over half the population
in Princess Anne. Landlords (including George Washington and Richard
Henry Lee) ﬁxed rents at certain quantities of gold or silver coin, though
their tenants could pay only in depreciating paper notes.66 In August, the
provincial convention elevated non-importation to a full embargo, and
by autumn, the British naval blockade of the Chesapeake made it difﬁcult
even to smuggle in necessities. Insurrection threatened in several counties
for lack of salt.67 Perhaps we should imagine, then, Josiah Philips reciting
these complaints at the head of an agitated crowd of laborers and merchants’ employees in Williamsburg. Or, better yet, drifting into the
Norfolk docks on a British tender, as Lord Dunmore’s agents reportedly
did, whispering to “the ﬁshermen and all the lower class of people” that
“those who advised them to take up arms” were in truth “their greatest enemies.”68 We cannot be certain, but stress was great, and many ordinary
64. John Richards to Edmund Pendleton, December 14, 1775, in “Virginia Legislative
Papers (Continued),” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 14 (1907): 391 (emphasis
mine); McDonnell, Politics of War, 127. The culprit, Jonathan Dew or Daw, had been
recruiting men to ﬁght for the king by promising them “four new shirts & a good set of
clothes & paid for their washing,” in addition to pay and quarter. Deposition of Charles
E. Woods, Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 14 (1907): 392.
65. Charles Ramsdell Lingley, The Transition in Virginia from Colony to Commonwealth
(New York: Columbia University, 1910), 119; Shepard, “The Administration of Justice,”
46–47; Hast, Loyalism in Revolutionary Virginia, 96–99; George, “Virginia Loyalists,”
173, 184–89; and Eckenrode, Revolution in Virginia, 100.
66. Holton, Forced Founders, 176; Shepard, “The Administration of Justice,” 87.
According to Shepard, 55% of people in Princess Anne were landless. More broadly,
throughout the Southside, “people . . . tended to be landless.”
67. Ivor Noel Hume, 1775: Another Part of the Field (New York: Knopf, 1966), 281,
370–71; and Holton, Forced Founders, 173–74.
68. Northampton Committee of Safety to the Continental Congress, November 25, 1775,
“Virginia Legislative Papers (Continued),” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 14
(1907): 254.
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men publicly despaired about the direction of affairs. As William Axtead
told his neighbors,
[I]t was useless to contend any longer; for they would be dam’d if the King
would ever give up Independency to America, that the present Dispute would
never be settled unless by Mobbs, that the People of this Country would
never be so well off as they had been, for they would never be able with
the same Quantity of any of their Commodities to purchase so much Sugar
as they formerly could, that the Poor People of this County would be sold
to support the Gent; . . . saying God damn the Guard [i.e., the militia] and
. . . the ﬁrst Son of a Bitch that durst offer to take a Piece of Meat out of
the House for the use of the Guard should have his back broke with an
iron Pestle &ca.69

Sometime later, George Mason would insist that “[t]here was never an
idler or falser notion than that which the British ministry have imposed
upon the nation, that this great Revolution has been the work of a faction,
of a junto of ambitious men, against the sense of the people of America.”
Nothing, Mason insisted, “has been done without [their] approbation”—
although he quickly added praise for “the cordial manner in which they
have cooperated,” not sensing the tension. But even if Mason was blind
to it, the British certainly saw a divergence between the interests of the
great planters and the landless classes, and Lord Dunmore advised the ministry to exploit it.70 It would be natural, then, for Dunmore to have employed
a man like Josiah Philips, who could convincingly describe how the costs of
revolution had fallen unfairly on the poor. Dunmore felt comfortable using
such men. He reputedly commissioned a Williamsburg stocking maker,
Adam Allen, to be his agent in “secret service,” and tasked him with stealing
the colony’s Great Seal from the patriot-controlled capitol.71 Philips, too,
later claimed to have a commission from Dunmore to recruit, although
there is no supporting evidence of it in public records.72
69. Virginia Antiquary, 1:103–4. For this, Axtead was brought before two Princess Anne
justices of the peace and then released on bond for good behavior.
70. Mason to George Mercer, October 2, 1778, in The Life of George Mason, 1725–1792,
vol. 1, ed. Kate Mason Rowland (New York: 1892), 299; Dunmore to Earl of Dartmouth, in
The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745–1799,
vol. 3, January, 1770–September, 1775, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1931), 249 n.94.
71. Hume, Another Part of the Field, 341–42.
72. I have not found evidence of an ofﬁcer’s commission in state papers; the list of men
commissioned by Dunmore in 1775 and 1776 to be part of the Queen’s Loyal Regiment does
not include Philips. Public Record Ofﬁce Class T1/580/113–114, microﬁlm, Virginia
Colonial Records Project, Library of Virginia. Neither is there evidence of any payments
to Philips in Dunmore’s accounts that I have examined. PRO Class T1/580/128–129,
Virginia Colonial Records Project. This does not rule out Philips’s service, as there were
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Consistent with this picture were reports that Philips associated with
escaped slaves: Will, who was “distinguished for [his] ferocity,” “negro
Sandy,” Bob, and probably others.73 Recruiting slaves was an important
part of Lord Dunmore’s strategy in Norfolk in the fall of 1775. It culminated in his Proclamation of November 15, 1775, in which the governor
declared all those “indented servants, Negroes, or others . . . free, that are
able and willing to bear arms” in the King’s service.74 Between 800 and
1500 slaves ﬂed to Dunmore. Some served as soldiers in a unit that
Dunmore called the “Ethiopian Regiment,” but others worked as spies or
ship pilots.75 Philips may have recruited some of the men who ﬂed, or
they may have ﬂed on their own and found him rather than Dunmore. In
some communities, slaves expressed a signiﬁcant emotional attachment
to the king, whom they believed intended to emancipate them, and perhaps
Philips delivered this message.76 Escaped slaves may have joined Philips to
avoid being recaptured and sent to work in the lead mines in the far western
part of the state, or even court martialed and executed.77 Legislative
records show, as well, that jailed slaves occasionally escaped their conﬁnes
and collected with other “outlyers” in swamps or highlands.78 Later in his
a number of British agents circulating in Virginia recruiting men and expressing disaffection
with patriot leadership. Randolph asserts that Philips had a commission to recruit. Edmund
Randolph, History of Virginia, ed. Arthur F. Schaffer (Charlottesville, VA: University of
Virginia Press, 1970), 269.
73. Eckenrode, Revolution in Virginia, 192–93 (“ferocity,” Bob); and Virginia Antiquary,
1:96–97 (Will and others).
74. Virginia Gazette (Dixon and Hunter), November 25, 1775, 3. As Sylvia Frey put it,
the British desired “to inspire enough black resistance to satisfy British military needs without inciting rebellion. . .. Instead of calling slaves to arms, the British army summoned them
to serve.” Sylvia Frey, “Between Slavery and Freedom: Virginia Blacks in the American
Revolution,” Journal of Southern History 49 (1983): 389.
75. McDonnell, Politics of War, 140 n. 8; and Woody Holton, Black Americans in the
Revolutionary Era: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2009),
8–9.
76. Brendan McConville, The King’s Three Faces: The Rise and Fall of Royal America,
1688–1776 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 170–81; and Holton,
Black Americans, 8.
77. Petition of William Evans to the Speaker and Members of Both Houses of the General
Assembly, October 27, 1790, Legislative Petitions of the General Assembly, 1776–1865,
Accession Number 36121, Box 89, Folder 17, Library of Virginia; and Petition of
Edmund Rufﬁn to the Speaker and Gentlemen of the House of Delegates, November 10,
1777, Legislative Petitions of the General Assembly, 1776–1865, Accession Number
36121, Box 23, Folder 5, Library of Virginia.
78. Petition of Robert Wilson to the Speaker and Members of the General Assembly,
October 22, 1791, Legislative Petitions of the General Assembly, 1776–1865, Accession
Number 36121, Box 150, Folder 24, Library of Virginia; and Petition of Arthur
Dickenson to the Speaker and Gentlemen of the House of Delegates, May 27, 1778,
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career, Philips would hide away in the Great Dismal Swamp on the southern borders of Norfolk and Princess Anne Counties.79 At the time, thousands of men and women lived there, including maroons, runaway
indentured white servants, Tuscarora Indians long separated from their
tribe, and “the Scratch Hall folk, tawny skinned and neither white nor
black.” It is possible that Philips recruited “swampers” from these communities as well.80
Whether or not Philips recruited escaped slaves to his gang, from plantations or the swamps, he surely knew the effect their presence had on the
imaginations of gentlemen planters. Maybe Will, Sandy and Bob did as
well. The planter class suffered from a “permanent undercurrent of fear,”
in which every event seemed ominously to portend a bloody rising of
the colony’s 180,000 slaves. Three years before Philips got his start, in
1772, Chief Justice Mansﬁeld of the King’s Bench had concluded in
Somerset v. Stewart that slavery had no basis in natural law or common
law, implying that it depended on the local law of Virginia. The decision
“caused a sensation in the colonies,” and Virginia planters in particular
“anticipated a ripening into bloody rebellion.”81 When Lord Dunmore
seized gunpowder from the colonial magazine at Williamsburg in late
April 1775, recalled Edmund Randolph, “it was believed . . . that he
designed, by disarming the people, to weaken the means of opposing an
insurrection of the slaves,” a policy Randolph described as “assassination.”82 A day later, Dunmore remarked to a local physician working in
the governor’s palace that if his senior ofﬁcers were injured in the tumult
over the seizure, he would “declare freedom to the slaves & reduce the
City of Wmsburg to ashes.”83 The comment was rash, but the threat was
clearly on his mind as he groped about for a way to seize the initiative.
Legislative Petitions of the General Assembly, 1776–1865, Accession Number 36121, Box
260, Folder 12, Library of Virginia.
79. Ulrich Troubetzkoy, “The Great Dismal Swamp,” Virginia Calvacade 10 (1961): 19.
80. Ward, Between the Lines, 171.
81. Holton, Forced Founders, 138 (“permanent undercurrent of fear”); Hume, Another
Part of the Field, 283–84; and Taylor, Internal Enemy, 21–22 (Somerset).
82. Randolph, History of Virginia, 219. In a statement to the House of Burgesses, John
Randolph conceded that although he never “heard the Governor expressly say, that he would
proclaim freedom to the Slaves, but he was so well satisﬁed that such was his Lordships
Intentions,” if he thought it necessary “in defence of his Person.” Deposition of John
Randolph in Regard to the Removal of the Powder, in “Virginia Legislative Papers
(Continued),” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 15 (1907): 149. On the connection between the gunpowder seizure and the fear of a slave uprising, see Hume, Another Part
of the Field, 141–42.
83. Deposition of Dr. William Pasteur, in “Virginia Legislative Papers,” Virginia
Magazine of History and Biography 13 (1905): 49.
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Virginia gentry were scared; the week of the seizure saw “more rumors of
slave plots . . . than during any previous week in Virginia history”—a
remarkable fact in a society habituated to rumor-mongering.84 Dunmore
understood that Virginians’ fear of insurrection was more than an abstract
concern for property. Wealthy planters in particular “felt threatened by
black Virginians in a personal, intimate manner.”85 The day after the
British Victory at Kemp’s Landing, in mid-October 1775, one woman
recalled “an ugly looking negro man, dressed up in a full suit of British
regimentals, and armed with a gun, came in upon us,” asking for
Virginia militiamen in “a saucy tone.” Memory had knit together her revulsion at the man’s appearance, his violent invasion of the home, and the
British army.86
So how did Virginia’s gentleman patriarchs see Josiah Philips? They
saw him at the head of an “Ignorant disorderly mob” of poor, landless
men. These were simple men. They lacked the independence and liberality
characteristic of gentlemen. The laboring poor were in constant need, readily manipulated, and lacking in virtue and self-control, defects of character
all plainly exhibited by their mobbing against convention policies.87
Gentlemen saw Philips with escaped slaves, too, or at least they heard
the tales. This they would have found deeply threatening. Escaped slaves
might foment insurrection among those still on their plantations. Slaves,
and especially black men, posed a constant threat of domestic invasion
and a sanguine, intimate violence described as “lust.”88 The violent slave
84. Holton, Black Americans, 7. For a sample of the unending stream of “fake news” in
the Virginia press during this period, see Parkinson, The Common Cause, 213–39; and
Hume, Another Part of the Field, 282–302, 335–42.
85. McDonnell, Politics of War, 143.
86. “My Mother,” in Lower Norfolk County Antiquary, vol. 2, ed. Edward W. James
(Baltimore: 1897), 134–35.
87. On the character of the Virginia gentleman, see Kevin Berland, Jan Kirsten Gilliam,
and Kenneth A. Lockridge, eds., The Commonplace Book of William Byrd II of Westover
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 82; and Isaac, Transformation of
Virginia, 39, 131–33. On gentry views of white servants, sailors, convicts, “vagrants,”
and other groups of “deviant” whites, see Morgan, Hegemony of the Law, 140–48.
According to Schwarz, “It always made a difference to communities whether [a] killer
was of a lower status than the killed.” Schwarz, Twice Condemned, 141.
88. Jefferson’s famous account of black Virginians in Query XIV of Notes on the State of
Virginia, suffused with a kind of scientiﬁc racism, described them as exhibiting a “lack of
forethought” and black men as being “more ardent after their female,” their “love [being
equivalent to] an eager desire.” Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, 139. For a recent,
highly compelling construction of Jefferson’s view of black and poor “corporality,” see
Maurizio Valsania, Jefferson’s Body: A Corporeal Biography (Charlottesville, VA:
University of Virginia Press, 2017), 22–23, 109–12, 146–63. The sexualization of black violence was widespread. Consider the Petition of the Citizens of Halifax County opposing
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became, in Robert Parkinson’s formulation, a “proxy” for the common
enemy, a status that justiﬁed the use of exemplary violence.89 Even poor
whites should understand the danger, planters thought. As Archibald
Cary groused in a letter to another leading Virginian, “Men of all ranks
resent the pointing a dagger to their Throats, thru the hands of their
Slaves.”90
Disorder and Attainder
Move forward now several months. Philips disappears from the record for
the moment, but likely he was busy stirring the pot, perhaps for Lord
Dunmore. For the people of Norfolk and Princess Anne, patriot or loyal,
the ﬁrst months of 1776 were hard ones. On January 1, the borough of
Norfolk was burned, largely by Virginia regulars.91 A week later, “sundry
Inhabitants of Princess Anne and Norfolk Counties” composed a petition
for the Fourth Provincial Convention in Williamsburg. Among the signers
was Thomas Newton Sr., a Norfolk physician and merchant, and John
Wilson, a former Burgess who would later serve as Norfolk County
Lieutenant (head of the militia), as well as other leading gentlemen.
Both men were from the area’s long-established, leading families.92
They reminded the convention that they had supported its revolutionary
measures, only to suffer under British occupation after the battle of
Kemp’s Landing. The presence of British soldiers had forced the men to
“abandon. . .our aged Parents, our Wives, our Children, & Families . . . to
emancipation, which warned of “all the Rapes, Murders, and Outrages, which a vast multitude of unprincipled, unpropertied, vindictive, and remorseless Banditti are capable of perpetrating.” Petition to the Virginia General Assembly, November 10, 1785, in Holton, Black
Americans, 90–91. Even the abolitionist Benjamin Franklin could speak this way, describing
“the wanton and unbridled Rage, Rapine and Lust, of Negroes, Mulattoes, and others, the
vilest and most abandoned of Mankind.” “Plain Truth,” quoted in Gould, Among the
Powers, 33.
89. Parkinson, Common Cause, 186–87, 227–29, 256–59; Lee, Crowds and Soldiers,
140–44; and Holton, Black Americans, 6–7. Holton observes that, although patriots accused
Britain of fomenting slave rebellion, “[a] careful review of the chronology of the relationship
. . . shows that it was often the slaves who incited the British.”
90. Cary to Richard Henry Lee (December 24, 1775), quoted in Holton, Black Americans,
10. As historian William Nelson describes this attitude, “the potential for black resistance
arguably threatened poor whites as well as wealthy ones and thereby gave upper-class whites
an argument for uniting the white underclass with them in their practices of repressing
blacks.” Nelson, Common Law, 3:32.
91. McDonnell, Politics of War, 135–74; and Eckenrode, Revolution in Virginia, 86–88.
92. Shepard, “The Administration of Justice,” 85.
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the Mercy of insidious Neighbours, the lawless plundering Soldier, & and
the more savage Slave.” The language of the plea spoke directly to the gentlemen who ﬁlled the convention. The anxiety, frustration, and shame of
exposing one’s dependents to abuse by “lawless” soldiers and “savage”
black intruders would have been palpable; it was a basic failure of patriarchal duty.93 Indeed, the petitioners continued, “Our Plantations have been
ravaged, our Wives & Children stripped almost to Nakedness, our very
Bed-Chambers invaded, at the silent Hour of Midnight, by Rufﬁans with
drawn Daggers and & Bayonets; our Houses not only robbed . . . but wantonly reduced by Fire to Ashes; our Persons treated with every Indignity
that elated Insolence & Cruelty could suggest.”
For the moment, British withdrawal had brought “a State of Safety,” but
it was temporary, and surely chaos would return with the redcoats. Before
that happened, the petitioners insisted, those “suspected” of disaffection
should be interrogated, and men who aided or fought with the British
removed “to some distant part of the Colony.” And although the convention had offered to pardon slaves who left Lord Dunmore’s service, the
petitioners did not “feel ourselves safe even at present, while they are suffered to go at large,” and requested instead that slaves be “conﬁned until an
Opportunity offers to transport them to some of the West India Islands.”94
The petition presented a dire picture, but provincial leadership was still
hoping for rapprochement and no action was taken. Several months later,
Major General Charles Lee of the continental army took up the cause
again and framed it as a military imperative. Writing to the Committee
of Safety, the state’s wartime executive, Lee wrote that his ﬁeld ofﬁcers
thought it “difﬁcult, if not impossible, to secure and preserve the
Province” if the many “dangerously dispos’d” remained in Norfolk.
93. This obligation lay near the center of the gentry worldview. Isaac, Transformation in
Virginia, 131–32. For a period expression, see the letter from William Byrd II to Charles,
Earl of Orrey, July 5, 1726, in “Virginia Council Journals,” Virginia Magazine of History
and Biography 32 (1924): 27. Jefferson, too, imagining himself as the “most blessed of
the patriarchs” in a letter to a friend, placed himself at Monticello, surrounded by family
(and books). It was an image he would invoke repeatedly. Rhys Isaac, “The First
Monticello,” in Jeffersonian Legacies, ed. Peter S. Onuf (Charlottesville, VA: University
of Virginia Press, 1993), 90–91; and Annette Gordon-Reed and Peter S. Onuf, Most
Blessed of the Patriarchs: Thomas Jefferson and the Empire of the Imagination
(New York: Liveright Publishing, 2016), 28–40.
94. Petition of the Inhabitants of Norfolk and Princess Anne Counties, undated, in
Revolutionary Virginia, The Road to Independence, vol. 5, The Class of Arms and the
Fourth Convention, 1775–1776, ed. Robert L. Scribner and Brent Tarter (Charlottesville,
VA: University of Virginia Press, 1979), 362–63. For a vivid account of a “midnight intrusion” into a bed chamber “with drawn daggers and bayonets,” related by a family member of
one of the Norfolk petitioners, see “My Mother,” 136–37.

516

Law and History Review, May 2019

They endangered not just the “preservation & being of the Province, [but
that] of the whole Continent.” Such men should be removed inland, and to
guarantee their good behavior the committee should take “their Wives and
Children . . . as hostages.”95 Lee therefore joined Dunmore in exploiting for
military advantage the domestic instability of the revolutionary household.96 The request was excessive, as was typical for Lee, but the situation
worried the committee nonetheless. It had learned from another source of
“a constant Intercourse” between the British ﬂeet and disaffected
Americans near the coast, and feared the provisions and intelligence
ﬂowing to the British would leave patriotic residents continually “exposed
to the Depredations of the Enemy.” In light of Lee’s warning, the
committee now ordered all individuals residing within the front lines “be
immediately removed” into the interior and their slaves conﬁned “at
some secure place.”97 When locals objected, the order was relaxed to
allow “friends or neutrals” “to remain at their habitations.”98 For his
part, Lee thought the compromise inadequate, and “threatened to demolish
the houses of several well-known loyalists in Portsmouth” as an example to
the rest.99
All the while, traditional government in Princess Anne and Norfolk
largely ceased to function. The Norfolk County Court had heard no civil
95. Charles Lee to John Page, April 8, 1776, in Revolutionary Virginia, The Road to
Independence, vol. 6, The Time for Decision, 1776, ed. Robert L. Scribner
(Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1981), 352.
96. Carol Berkin, Revolutionary Mothers: Women in the Struggle for American
Independence (New York: Knopf, 2005), 38–42.
97. Scriber and Tarter, Revolutionary Virginia, 5:402 n. 3; and Unanimous Resolution for
the Evacuation of Parts of Norfolk and Princess Anne Counties, April 10, 1776, in Scribner,
Revolutionary Virginia, 6:369–70.
98. Petition of the Committee of Safety of Princess Anne County, 1776, in “Virginia
Legislative Papers (Continued),” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 17 (1909):
173. The Princess Anne Committee asserted that only “ﬁfteen or Twenty” of their slaves
had joined Dunmore, and that, in general, “[w]e have but few” slaves. For the modiﬁed
order, see Virginia Committee of Safety, Proceedings of the Committee, May 3, 1776, in
Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 6:514.
99. Eckenrode, Revolution in Virginia, 91. A blanket removal was again ordered in
October 1777. For the context of this order, which was made by Governor Patrick Henry
and the Privy Council, see George, “Virginia Loyalists,” 205; and Robert Leroy Hilldrup,
“The Virginia Constitution of 1776: A Study in Revolutionary Politics” (PhD diss.,
University of Virginia, 1935), 119. The General Assembly indemniﬁed the governor and
the council for the removal: An Act for indemnifying the Governor and Council, and others,
for removing and conﬁning Suspected Persons during the late public danger. Hening,
Statutes at Large, 9:373–74. Jefferson apparently drafted the statute, which appears in his
papers. Bill Indemnifying the Executive for Removing and Conﬁning Suspected Persons,
in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 2, 2 January 1777 to 18 June 1779, ed. Julian
P. Boyd (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950), 119.
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suits since July 1774, though it continued to handle some administrative
and criminal matters. Its courthouse was destroyed when the city burned,
and court convened only three times between October 1775 and July
1777. After July it resumed its monthly meetings in a private home.100
The Norfolk Borough Hustings Court, whose jurisdiction was similar to
that of the county court, did not hold a recorded meeting for 3 years
after February 1775. In Princess Anne, the gentlemen justices met only
twice between August 1775 and July 1776. Even when the justices met,
however, the court could do little to enforce warrants and orders against
the disaffected, because execution of its process depended, ultimately, on
the militia, which was “inoperative.”101 At bottom, both the county court
system and the local committees of safety relied on the cooperation of residents, and the people of Princess Anne and Norfolk were divided and fearful. Richard Beeman has argued that the ability of a county government
“to serve the particular legal needs of nearly all the citizenry at the local
level” was crucial in dampening disaffection in Virginia’s southwest.
The counties of the southeast were, in contrast, largely ungoverned during
this period, and so it was that in the spring of 1776 “[l]oyalist banditti
freely raided” in both Norfolk and Princess Anne. The raids abated
when Dunmore left the area in late May, but increased again in 1777
and continued through much of the war.102

100. Other county courts were also affected by the outbreak of hostilities. The ﬁrst
Provincial Convention had permitted the court “fee bill” to expire, effectively closing the
courts to suits for recovery of a debt, but justices in most counties remained active throughout the war collecting taxes, settling estates, convening grand juries, and generally preserving what one contemporary called “Peace and good Order.” Lingley, Transition in Virginia,
70, 114 (fee bill); Shepard, “The Administration of Justice,” 48–51; Alan McKinley Smith,
“Virginia Lawyers, 1680–1776: The Birth of a Profession” (PhD diss., Johns Hopkins
University, 1967), 39–40; Charles T. Cullen, St. George Tucker and Law in Virginia,
1772–1804 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987), 31; and Robert L. Scribner, ed.,
Revolutionary Virginia, The Road to Independence, vol. 1, Forming Thunderclouds and
the First Convention, 1763–1774 (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press), 280
(“Peace and good Order”). In July 1776, after enacting the state’s new constitution, the
Provincial Convention authorized county courts to resume sitting. Hening, Statutes at
Large, 9:126. Norfolk courts would not sit regularly for at least another year.
101. Shepard, “The Administration of Justice,” 52–53; Hast, Loyalism in Revolutionary
Virginia, 92, 99; and An act to empower the justices of the county of Norfolk to hold
Court at such place as they shall appoint, in Hening, Statutes at Large, 9:231.
102. Richard R. Beeman, “The Political Response to Social Conﬂict in the Southern
Backcountry: A Comparative View of Virginia and the Carolinas during the Revolution,”
in An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry During the American Revolution, ed.
Ronald Hoffman, Thad W. Tate, and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, VA: University of
Virginia Press, 1985), 228, 233; and Ward, Between the Lines, 154 (“freely raided”).
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It is in this context that Josiah Philips reappears in the record, now graduated to leading a “conspiracy” rather than a mob. In June 1777 there is an
entry in the Journal of the Virginia Council of State, describing a letter
from Norfolk County Lieutenant John Wilson—whose petition to the convention we examined above—complaining of “sundry evil disposed persons, to the number of ten, or twelve,” who “have conspired together, to
foment a Dangerous Insurrection in the said County, and at present are
lurking in secret places threatening and doing actual mischief to the peaceable and well affected Inhabitants.” The party was led by “Levy Sikes,
Josiah Phillips, and John Ashley.” That theirs was a conspiracy to foment
insurrection suggests a political motivation. Still, the conspiracy was likely
not yet a great danger to the state, because Wilson requested a relatively
small reward, $150, for capturing the principals, whom, he said, were
“to be dealt with according to Law,” that is, by ordinary process of referral
to the General Court for jury trial. This was enough; apparently Philips was
captured. The following January, the council approved payment of an
award to “sundry persons for apprehending Josiah Philips,” with ₤10 to
“a free Mulatto for informg where the said Philips was.”103
Philips soon escaped. We don’t know how, but escapes by loyalist prisoners were not uncommon when they had assistance. Several months later,
on May 1, 1778, Governor Patrick Henry received a letter from County
Lieutenant George Muter “informing him that Phillips the noted Traitor
has again made an Insurrection in Princess Anne County at the head of
ﬁfty Men,” and requesting 150 of the Nansemond militia to march against
them. Muter requested, as well, that a signiﬁcant reward of $500 be offered
for Philips’s apprehension, “dead or alive,” and that anyone participating
be permitted a share in “the Booty taken from the said Insurgents.”104
At approximately the same time, hearing “of ravages committed by
Philips and his notorious gang,” Lieutenant John Wilson called up men
from four companies of the Norfolk militia, whose full force was “upward
of two hundred.” Ten men answered. Wilson “compelled twenty others
103. H. R. McIlwaine, ed., Journals of the Council of the State of Virginia, vol. 1, July 12,
1776–October 2, 1777 (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1931), 435–36; and
H. R. McIlwaine, ed., Journals of the Council of the State of Virginia, vol. 2, October 6,
1777–November 30, 1781 (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1932), 58. The Journal states
that Philips had been “outlawed by the Governor . . . as a Traitor to the State,” rather than
simply bountied, but this is probably incorrect. Outlawry was a procedure at common law
and in a strict sense beyond the power of the governor to perform. Elsewhere, as will be discussed, Henry expressly acknowledged the limits of his powers as governor to address the
Philips threat.
104. H. R. McIlwaine, ed., Ofﬁcial Letters of the Governors of the State of Virginia,
vol. 1, The Letters of Patrick Henry (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1926), 267–68;
and McIlwaine, Journals of the Council, 2:127.
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into duty,” placing them under the command of Captain Josiah Wilson, but
a quarter of the force deserted the ﬁrst night. Someone likely informed
Philips of the mission, and the insurgents “were either taken to their secret
places in the swamp, or concealed by their friends,” so that “no intelligence
could be obtained.” The next day, Captain Wilson went to the house of a
neighbor on some business. As he approached, he “was ﬁred on by four
men concealed in the house” and mortally wounded. Lieutenant Wilson
wrote to the governor. Just as he had done 2 years earlier in the petition
to the provincial convention, he now asked for a mass removal. Unless
“the relations and friends of those villains” were removed from Norfolk,
Wilson insisted, there could be no “peace and security.”105
Within several months, the Philips gang would be broken up. Governor
Henry agreed to offer a substantial award for Philips’s capture and to order
additional militia into the area—steps similar to those Congress had taken
in response to the murder of a militia captain in Bladen County, North
Carolina, the year before.106 Yet Henry thought “the executive power . . .
not competent” to satisfy Wilson’s principal request, the mass removal
of families “in league with the insurgents.” According to Henry, the assembly were “the only judges [of] how far the methods of proceeding directed
by law are to be dispensed with on this occasion.”107 Henry forwarded
Wilson’s letter to the House of Delegates on May 27, approximately a
week after Wilson wrote, and the House took up the matter the next
day. After deliberating for “some time” on a number of issues, the
House concluded that Josiah Philips had “levied war” against Virginia,
“committing murders, burning houses, wasting farms, and doing other
acts of enormity.” What evidence the delegates had before them, in addition to the letter, we do not know; Philips’s conduct may have been widely
known or merely rumored. The House resolved that Philips be attainted of
treason and referred the matter to a select committee for drafting.

105. John Wilson to Patrick Henry, May 20, 1778, in William Wirt, The Life of Patrick
Henry (Philadelphia: 1836), 237–38.
106. Lee, Crowds and Soldiers, 157–58. Congress examined witnesses to a reprisal killing
and offered a reward for the capture of those believed responsible for the attack. In addition,
its proclamation authorized pursuers to “kill and destroy” the suspects if they resisted.
107. Henry to Benjamin Harrison, May 27, 1778, in McIlwaine, Ofﬁcial Letters of the
Governors, 1:282–83. The council had recommended that Henry remove the “[f]amilies
as are in League with the Insurgents,” and that for this purpose he should forward
Wilson’s letter to the assembly; in addition, the council recommended that Henry order a
company of regulars to the area to cooperate with militia “in Crushing these
Desperadoes.” McIlwaine, Journals of the Council, 2:140.
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This committee was led by Jefferson and included John Tyler Sr., a countycourt lawyer, future Anti-Federalist, and General Court judge.108
Perhaps Jefferson had already drafted a bill; years later, he would recall
Henry approaching him immediately upon receiving Wilson’s letter. In a
study of the early Virginia executive, Emory Evans observed that it was
not uncommon for governors to consult with members of the House,
although it was usually through the speaker. Here there was clearly a
sense that time was of the essence. Jefferson’s committee reported a bill
later the same day. It added robbery to the committee’s charges of treason
and murder, and gave Philips and his unnamed “associates and confederates” an opportunity to surrender and claim a trial. If Philips failed to surrender by the deadline, he would “suffer the pains of death,” the “sentence
of attainder” to be executed upon his capture “by order of the General court
. . . as soon as may be conveniently.” Associates might still claim a trial on
the question of their afﬁliation with Philips, but the caveat made for tenuous insurance; after the grace period it would be lawful for “any person” to
“pursue and slay” a gang member. No objections to the bill are recorded. It
was signed into law on June 1, a week after the House had taken up the
matter. Philips had until to June 30 to surrender.109
The Place of Legislative Attainder in the Republican Legal Mind
If the status of legislative attainder was uncertain at the time of the imperial
crisis, why did Jefferson turn to it so quickly? Years later, Jefferson would
recall that, upon learning of Captain Josiah Wilson’s murder, both he and
Henry had “thought the best proceeding would be by bill of attainder,
unless he delivered himself up for trial within a given time.” Why?110
108. Report of the Committee on the State of the Commonwealth, May 28, 1778, in
Journal of the House of Delegates [May 1778], 22–23. The clerk of the House who docketed
the bill was Edmund Randolph. Journal of the House of Delegates [May 1778], 30; John
P. Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino, eds., The Documentary History of the Ratiﬁcation
of the Constitution, vol. 9, Virginia, No. 2 (Madison, WI: Wisconsin Historical Society
Press, 1990), 1004 n. 5.
109. Jefferson to William Wirt, August 14, 1814, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson,
Retirement Series, vol. 7, 28 November 1813–30 September 1814, ed. J. Jefferson Looney
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2010), 548–49 (Henry shared Wilson’s letter with
Jefferson); Emory G. Evans, “Executive Leadership in Virginia, 1776–1781: Henry,
Jefferson, and Nelson,” in Sovereign States in an Age of Uncertainty, ed. Ronald Hoffman
and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1981), 192–93, 204; Journal
of the House of Delegates [May 1778], 22, 24, 28, 29, 35; Bill to Attaint Josiah Philips, May
28, 1778, in Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 2:189–91; and Hening, Statutes at Large, 9:463–64.
110. Jefferson to William Wirt, August 14, 1814, in Papers of Thomas Jefferson,
Retirement Series, 7:549.

The Legislature at War

521

With Jefferson, at least, no explanation would be complete that failed to
take stock of the writings he obsessively consumed, and with which he
sought to craft an enlightened, republican persona. An examination of
these sources shows that Jefferson was familiar with bills of attainder by
the time he served in the House of Delegates. Indeed, Jefferson’s study
of “the laws and course of Parliament” began early in his legal career. A
letter to John Page written in 1766, when Jefferson was only 23 years
old, expresses annoyance at the informality of proceedings in the
Maryland legislature, using the peevish language of an initiate. By then
Jefferson had been clerking in George Wythe’s law ofﬁce for 4 years,
which would have been plenty of time to develop these prejudices, as
well as some real expertise. In 1769, Wythe became clerk of the House
of Burgesses and made his own study of parliamentary law, which
Jefferson may have consulted, but Jefferson wrote later that he had “at
an early period of life, read a good deal on the subject, and commonplaced
what I read.” Sometime in the late 1760s, Jefferson began to assemble a
“Parliamentary Pocket-Book,” commonplacing major parliamentary texts.
The Parliamentary Pocket-Book contained several entries on attainder,
including Coke’s remark in the Fourth Part of the Institutes that
Parliament had attainted Thomas Cromwell “without [his] being called
to answer,” but that such a practice, although lawful, ought to be
forgotten.111
Early Pocket-Book entries were drawn primarily from the Modus
Tenendi Parliamentum, a fourteenth century text, and George Petyt’s seventeeth century Lex Parliamentaria, but Jefferson also had access to other
sources from which he would have constructed his view of “the occasion
and proper ofﬁce of the bill of attainder.”112 In addition to the Fourth Part
of the Institutes and Lex Parliamentaria, Jefferson ordered William Petyt’s
Jus Parliamentarium in October 1769, in preparation for his service in the
colonial House of Burgesses, although the text may have been lost in the
Shadwell ﬁre.113 Jefferson acquired another important volume in 1773 or
111. Jefferson to John Page, May 25, 1766, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1,
1760–1776, ed. Julian P. Boyd (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950), 19–20;
Jefferson to George Wythe, February 28, 1800, in Jefferson’s Parliamentary Writings, ed.
Wilbur Samuel Howell (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 3 (“commonplaced
what I read”); Howell, Jefferson’s Parliamentary Writings, 43 (date Pocket-Book was
begun); and Parliamentary Pocket-Book, para. 41, in Howell, Jefferson’s Parliamentary
Writings, 58 (Cromwell).
112. Jefferson to Louis Girardin, March 12, 1815, in Papers of Thomas Jefferson,
Retirement Series, 8:334.
113. Perkins, Buchanan, & Brown to Jefferson, October 2, 1769, in Papers of Thomas
Jefferson, 1:34.
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thereabouts, Of the Judicature in Parliaments (1681), a tract traditionally
attributed (erroneously) to John Selden, the English lawyer, member of
Parliament and antiquarian. Judicature in Parliaments describes a number
of English legislative prosecutions and proffers some limits on its jurisdiction.114 Probably more important than any of these law books, however,
were two histories: History of the Rebellion (1720), by Edward Hyde,
earl of Clarendon, and John Rushworth’s Historical Collections of
Private Passages of State (1721), the ﬁrst of which Jefferson had read
by 1771.115 Both volumes contain parliamentary speeches made during
the attainder of Thomas Wentworth, earl of Strafford, describing what
were thought to be signal limits on the legal powers of Parliament.116
One historian has concluded that Jefferson tended to prefer such “historical
and political accounts of law,” as evidenced in his patterns of commonplacing, which engage the sources more deeply than Jefferson did “legal
reporting.”117 The great library of the Virginia Council of State, assuming
it was still intact in 1778, held all these volumes as well. Recent bibliographic scholarship reveals that Jefferson relied on this library to guide
him as the imperial crisis unfolded; it was, Jefferson wrote, “with the
help . . . of Rushworth, whom we rummaged over for the revolutionary
precedents & forms,” that he, Patrick Henry and others had drafted a resolution in response to the Coercive Acts.118 Jefferson’s ﬂight to histories,
precedents, and forms bears out Trevor Colbourn’s observation, made
years ago, that Jefferson treated Whiggish history as a vital source of experience, from which one could draw an understanding of the logic of contemporary events.119
114. The Thomas Jefferson”s Libraries database identiﬁes the book as belonging to the
“Monticello Library,” assembled between 1770 and 1815; http://www.librarything.com/
work/4069900/book/22053709 (last accessed February, 22, 2019). Sowerby writes that
“[J]efferson acquired this volume though his wife’s family; the autograph signature of
John Wayles occurs in three places . . . .” E. Millicent Sowerby, Catalogue of the Library
of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1953), 180, entry
2887. On the attribution of Of the Judicature of Parliaments, see Elizabeth Read Foster,
“The Painful Labour of Mr. Elsyng,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society
62 (1972): 5, 42–45.
115. Jefferson to Robert Skipwith, August 3, 1771, in Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 1:80.
116. On the importance of Rushworth to Jefferson’s thinking, see Trevor Colbourn, The
Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual Origins of the American Revolution
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 159–60.
117. Crow, Thomas Jefferson, Legal History, and the Art of Recollection, 73.
118. Paul Leicester Ford, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, 1760–1775
(New York: Putnam, 1892), 10; and Brent Tarter, “The Library of the Council of
Colonial Virginia,” in Billings and Tarter, “Esteemed Bookes of Lawe”, 45–53.
119. Colbourn, Lamp of Experience, 160.
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In constructing Jefferson’s views of attainder, one should also consider
the account given in John Hatsell’s inﬂuential tract, Precedents of
Proceedings in the House of Commons, although Jefferson did not acquire
the text until 1785. Jefferson repeatedly praised Hatsell and professed to
rely heavily on it in preparing a manual of procedure for the United States
Senate.120 The treatise contained many entries on attainder, listing individuals who had been attainted by Parliament and on what grounds. These proceedings had been aimed at “persons concerned in raising traitorous and
tumultuous insurrections,” particularly where it was impossible for “justice
[to be] obtained by a regular trial in a court of criminal jurisdiction.”
Although bills of attainder had also been used to oppress, Hatsell disagreed
with Blackstone that “proceeding by Bill is in no case expedient or proper,”
because it was not preferable that “the highest and most daring criminals
against the State should escape with impunity, . . . rather than that their
crimes should be brought to the consideration of Parliament.” Attainder in
Parliament was justiﬁed “in cases of absolute necessity, . . . where, from
the magnitude of the crime, or the imminent danger to the state, it would
be a greater public mischief to suffer the offense to go unpunished, than
even to overstep the common boundaries of the law.” Writing in 1815,
Jefferson described the “proper ofﬁce” of bills of attainder in precisely
these terms, although his personal copy of Hatsell was by then packed in
a book box for shipment to Congress, to which it had just been sold.121
Jefferson was uniquely well read, but there is evidence that Patrick
Henry also viewed legislative attainder in this light. Henry is not known
for his erudition, and famously claimed to have prepared for his bar examination by reading the First Part of the Institutes and the Laws of Virginia
over the course of a single month. The picture is likely overdrawn.122
Wherever they came from, however, by 1776 Henry held strong views
about the function of bills of attainder. According to Edmund
Randolph’s History of Virginia, it was Henry who succeeded in removing
a prohibition of legislative attainder from a draft of the Virginia’s ﬁrst state
120. Howell, Jefferson’s Parliamentary Writings, 43; and Lewis Deschler, Jefferson’s
Manual and the Rules of the House of Representatives (Washington, DC: United States
Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1961), 115 n. Jefferson wrote, “I could not doubt the necessity
of quoting the sources of my information, among which Mr. Hatsel’s most valuable book is
preeminent.”
121. John Hatsell, Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons, vol. 4 (London
1796), 89–90; Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Retirement Series, 8:334.
122. Kevin J. Hayes, “The Law Library of a Working Attorney: The Example of Patrick
Henry,” in Billings and Tarter, “Esteemed Bookes of Lawe”, 140. This view of Henry is to
some degree a product of William Wirt’s early biography, whose emphasis on Henry’s lack
of book learning served to magnify Henry’s legend in the minds of Virginia’s advocates of
local power, the “Old Republicans.” Miller, Juries and Judges, 3–4.
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constitution, painting “a terrifying picture of some towering public
offender against whom ordinary laws would be impotent” and thereby
“saving that dread power from being expressly proscribed.” Henry’s attack
was part of a larger effort by Virginia radicals to enhance the capacity of
government to provide security by passing acts that functioned as judgments. Thus, against the draft’s proposed ban of ex post facto laws,
Thomas Ludwell Lee argued that retroactive lawmaking might be required
by “the law of necessity—the exigencies of life,” such as “when the safety
of the State absolutely requires [it].” As one commentator described it, the
radicals’ aim was to give “martial law constitutional sanction,” although
the problem might also be described as setting proper boundaries between
the common law and other, summary forms of legal proceeding, a task
familiar to gentlemen raised in an empire of legal plurality.123 Much
later, Henry would insist that this boundary could be demarcated using
principles taken from natural law and the law of nations. Under these principles, Henry maintained, pirates and bandits lost their right to common
law proceedings by having renounced government altogether. As the bandit, in effect, had waived his right to a jury trial, it was lawful to condemn
him by the summary procedures used in the legislature for notorious
offenses. Notably, Henry had long been interested in the law of nations
and was well read in the publicist tradition.124
The inﬂuence of natural law and the law of nations on Henry’s thinking
was only strengthened by the transition to republican government. Bills of
attainder ﬁt naturally in a republican assembly. The gentlemen justices who
presided over criminal trials in the county courts also sat in the assembly,
comprising nearly half the members of the House of Delegates.125 Some of
these men had English legal training, as has been mentioned. Nearly all of
them took pains to distinguish their learning from that of the professional
lawyers in Williamsburg. Gentlemen judged by what planter Landon
Carter called “good reason and experience,” not the “Mechanical” knowledge of professionals, whose learning, he gibed, amounted to “knowing
from whom to Copy Properly.”126 When Virginia’s great men, whom
the evangelical minister Devereux Jarratt called “beings of a superior
123. Randolph, History of Virginia, 255 (“terrifying picture”); and Hilldrup, The Virginia
Constitution, 183 (“martial law”).
124. Kaminsky and Saladino, Documentary History of the Ratiﬁcation, 9:1038; and
Hayes, “The Law Library,” 149–50.
125. Miller, Juries and Judges, 25. In contrast, professional lawyers made up 6% of the
membership of the House between 1720 and 1776. Roeber, Faithful Magistrates, 145.
126. Quoted in Isaac, Transformation, 133–34 (“good reason and experience”); and Jack
P. Greene, ed., Diary of Landon Carter, vol. 1 (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society,
1965), 93 (“knowing from whom to Copy”).
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order,” were gathered in assembly, they embodied “the corporate integrity
of colony communities.”127 This was the place where the gentlemen fathers
of the colonial family could decide together, as peers, how best to preserve
the peace and safety of the colonial household. That such matters were
appropriate for an assembly was precisely why the Virginia Constitution
had not banned bills of attainder or ex post facto laws. Just as gentlemen
justices did in the county courts, delegates in the House would decide
on the proper form of law by drawing on their experience, reason, common
sense, and basic principles of natural law and positive law.128
Jefferson did not share the country justices’ disdain for law books and
precedents, of course, but his view of the legal powers of a republican
assembly was similar to theirs. Normally, he thought, insurrections should
be dealt with by exposing their agents “to the pains of the law.”129 In
extraordinary circumstances, however, where courts of law could not operate effectively, Jefferson agreed that there was a residual power to do justice by some other means. Ancient precedents made this clear. If, strictly
speaking, such a power had formerly been the prerogative of the king,
under republican government it should be vested in the elected assembly,
along with other royal prerogatives relating to security and justice.130 Acts
of attainder were a natural, republican expression of the residual duty to do
justice in extraordinary circumstances.131 To Jefferson’s eye, the learning
and reﬁnement of his circle of friends in the House, under the guidance
of professional lawyers sitting there, ensured that the body would proceed
with moderation, prudence, and self-control, as these were the virtues that
distinguished a natural aristocracy.132

127. Quoted in Roeber, Faithful Magistrates, 78 (“superior order”); Peter S. Onuf,
“Thomas Jefferson, Federalist,” in Mind of Thomas Jefferson, 90.
128. On the connection between family and state, see Peter S. Onuf, “Making Sense of
Jefferson,” 33.
129. Jefferson to William Preston, March 21, 1780, in Papers of Thomas Jefferson,
3:534–35.
130. Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 1:342. Jefferson’s ﬁrst draft of a constitution for the
state of Virginia famously provides that the prerogative powers of declaring war or peace,
issuing letters of marque and reprisal, and erecting courts are to “be exercised by the legislature alone.”
131. Crow, Thomas Jefferson, Legal History, and the Art of Recollection, 88–89, 105.
Notably, Jefferson’s proposed revision of Virginia’s colonial criminal laws, prepared
close to the time of Philips’s attainder, impliedly recognized a legislative power to attaint
by bill, as it would prohibit only those attainders that worked a “corruption of blood”;
that is, inherited civil disability. Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in Cases
Heretofore Capital, in Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 2:506–7 n. 21.
132. Valsania, Jefferson’s Body, 19–20, 27; and Roeber, Faithful Magistrates, 164.
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We should conclude, I think, that Jefferson and Henry were familiar
with precedents for legislative attainder, and that these precedents were
not diminished in their minds by Virginia’s transition to republican government, but, in fact, had been enhanced. We should conclude, as well, that
Jefferson and Henry believed precedent to support the use of attainder
against Philips. Norfolk and Princess Anne were on the verge of lawlessness. Banditti including escaped slaves had invaded the homes of the gentlemen justices and their peers. They now struck directly at the military
force directed by those same gentlemen. If delegates failed to address
the murder of a militia captain from a great family such as the Wilsons,
they would risk losing the cooperation of other men of ability and property,
and the entire structure of the military and civil governance could collapse.
Calling on these distant precedents, they hoped to direct the force of the
community itself against the gang, reafﬁrming the leadership of great
men and preserving the peace of their households against a deeply set
fear of black violence. The audience for their argument was the men of
the assembly, and in particular the House of Delegates, whose primacy
in doing justice and maintaining security they recognized and supported.133

The Breakup of the Gang
As it turned out, however, an act of attainder was not necessary to preserve
security in Norfolk and Princess Anne. The act passed against Philips
almost certainly had no effect at all. What worked against Philips were
the conventional institutions of civil government in wartime Virginia: the
militias and the county courts. Extraordinary forms of law had been
unnecessary.
The act of attainder was reported in Purdie’s Virginia Gazette on June 5,
4 days after it passed. One day earlier, however, on June 4, Philips and an
associate, James Hodges, were captured at night by a volunteer militia
company led by Captain Amos Weeks. How this came about is unclear;
another man afﬁliated with the gang, Henry M’Clelen, had been arrested
several weeks earlier and may have provided intelligence. A week later,
on June 11, 1778, Philips, Hodges, Cornelius Land (who had been sought
since May), and Caleb Moore and Henry Burgess, two others likely associated with the gang, were all brought before the Princess Anne County
133. As Emory Evans describes, both Henry and Jefferson were “sensitive to and respectful of” the primacy of the legislature in the state government, even during wartime, and they
consistently sought out authority from the legislature in the form of delegation, indemniﬁcation, or pardon. Evans, “Executive Leadership in Virginia,” 191, 192, 202–3.
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Court for examination, where they faced a mass of county residents who
had appeared to testify about their behavior. The charge was “feloniously
robbing the Continent of America of sundry goods,” including linen, bunting, buttons, hats and muskets—a haul suggestive of a continental army
supply—and robbing another man of lead and powder. Witnesses were
called, Philips and Hodges “heard in their defense,” and the matter concluded, the county court binding the two men over to the General Court
for charges of robbery, as was the usual practice for capital crimes. No
mention was made of the bill of attainder. Its publication in the Gazette
had occupied but one line, and the justices may not have known of it.134
The Norfolk County Court was busy as well. Two weeks later, on June
30, 1778, Wilson Pinkerton was charged in the death of Captain Josiah
Wilson. Testimony was taken and Pinkerton was bound over for trial in
a court of oyer and terminer to be held in Williamsburg. His testimony
may have produced intelligence, or an effort to shift the blame, and further
arrests were imminent. On July 16, Mason Miller and Robert Hodges
appeared in court, Robert being a brother of James Hodges, who had
been examined by the court in Princess Anne. Notably, Hodges and
Miller’s charge, “treason, murder and robbery,” was now suggestive of
the language of the act of attainder. The men were transferred to the
General Court for trial. Later the same day, Thornton Miller was brought
before the justices, charged with “High Treason, Murder, and Robbery,”
and bound over on all three charges.135
In the ﬁrst days of August, two escaped slaves, “negro Sandy” and
“Bob,” were brought to the Norfolk County Court bar and also charged
with treason and murder. Whose murder they are alleged to have committed the clerk’s record does not say, but Sandy had belonged to Josiah
Wilson, the murdered militia captain, and a charge of treason may have
hinged on a belief that he had conspired in his master’s death.136 As
134. Virginia Gazette (Purdie), June 5, 1778, 2 (act of attainder); Virginia Gazette
(Purdie), June 19, 1778, 2 (Parker and Hodges jailed); McIlwaine, Journals of the
Council, 2:210 (Captain Amos Weeks); Princess Anne County Minute Book, May 16,
1778, microﬁlm, typescript, County Court Order Books, Library of Virginia (M’Clelen’s
arrest); Princess Anne County Minute Book, June 11, 1778 (arraignment of Philips,
Hodges, Land, Moore, and Burgess); and Virginia Antiquary, 1:92–93 (Land).
135. Norfolk County Order Book, June 30, 1778 (Pinkerton); and Norfolk County Order
Book, July 16, 1778 (Miller and Hodges).
136. During Jefferson’s term as governor, Justices of the Peace Henry Lee and William
Carr dissented from the judgment of the Prince William County Court condemning a
slave Billy to death for high treason, on the grounds that he was not a citizen and therefore
did not owe the state allegiance and could not commit treason. William P. Palmer, ed.,
Calendar of Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts [. . .], vol. 2, April 1, 1781 to
December 31, 1781 (Richmond, 1881), 90–91. Billy’s owner, Mann Page, appealed to
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recorded by the clerk, both Sandy and Bob testiﬁed that they were “in no
wise guilty,” but the language is formulaic and the substance of their defense
is not revealed. Sitting as a court of oyer and terminer, the justices could try
slaves without a jury, and both Sandy and Bob were convicted and sentenced
to be executed at the end of the week. After sentencing Bob, the gentlemen
justices added an order “that the Sheriff do hang up the Body of the said
Bob, after it is Dead, at some Place near that of Execution, to wit where
Sandy, belonging to Josiah Wilson, is to be hung up, that is where they
shall be most conspicuous, and least offensive, and there leave it to
remain.”137 The intent of the punishment, which one exhaustive study
describes as “severe and unusual for Norfolk,” was surely to use Sandy
and Bob’s decaying bodies to terrorize other slaves. The special criminal
jurisdiction that the county court possessed over slaves—a jurisdiction it
did not possess over the cases of free banditti—empowered the gentlemen
justices to use the court to quiet their own fears about slave insurrection.138
The next day Jesse Phillpot was brought before the justices, charged
with treason and murder, heard in his defense, and bound over for trial
in Williamsburg. Phillpot was simultaneously being sued in a civil action
on a writ of trespass in Princess Anne, in which the plaintiff described him
as working with two black men, “Will . . . and the other Negro,” robbing
multiple houses in the course of one night. This was the ‘ferocious’
Will, later accused of “aiding and abetting Josiah Phillips,” and who
“struck such terror into the inhabitants of Norfolk and Princess Anne”
that County Lieutenant John Wilson had personally offered a ₤100 reward
to whomever “should put him to death.” The reward went to Zadock
Dailey, who had deserted his company of Virginia regulars but now earned
a pardon and ₤100 for killing Will. Phillpot, for his part, was tried in
Williamsburg in March 1779, along with Pinkerton, Miller, and

Jefferson, who granted a reprieve on that ground. Mann then petitioned the House for a pardon, and a bill of pardon was ordered prepared; whether it passed out of the House, and
whether it ever went to the Senate (or was required to), is unknown. Journal of the
House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of Virginia; Begun [. . .] Monday, the Seventh
Day of May, in the Year of our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and Eighty-One
(Richmond: 1828), 12 (entry for June 9, 1781); Eckenrode, Revolution in Virginia, 259.
In this case, Sandy might have been charged with petit treason for the murder of his master,
although the record contains no such language.
137. Norfolk County Order Book, August 3, 1778 and August 5, 1778.
138. Shepard, “The Norfolk Courts,” 80. As Shepard notes, there were a relatively large
number of slaves tried before county courts of oyer and teriminer in 1778, suggesting the
possibility of other escaped slaves in Philips’s gang, although the records do not conﬁrm
this.
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Thornton, who were all found guilty and sentenced to death.139 Yet Phillpot,
at least, was never executed. He died peacefully several years later in
Princess Anne, wealthy enough to own two slaves. The result, although surprising, was not unheard of in counties like Princess Anne and Norfolk,
where “local dynamics of loyalism” (combined with a limited capacity to
imprison people) made it possible even for men charged with treason to
return to the community. The Virginia Gazette never reported the execution
of Pinkerton, Miller, and Thornton; perhaps they, too, were pardoned or
escaped.140 We read of no redemption for Sandy or Bob.141
Put under heavy guard, Philips waited for 3 months in a Williamsburg
jail to be tried on charges of felony robbery. In October 1778, he was
indicted on charges of feloniously robbing some hats and twine. The magniﬁcence of his crimes was now dwindling in the record. The Virginia
Gazette reported that Philips had allegedly “robb[ed] the publick waggons,” although it added, parenthetically, sensing that a reminder was
needed, that the man had earlier been “accused of murder, treason, and
sundry other outrages.” The jury found him guilty. Philips, Robert
Hodges, James Hodges, and Henry M’Clelen were sentenced to death
and executed by hanging in December 1778.142
Disorder lived on for some time in Princess Anne and Norfolk. Nearly 2
years after Philips’s execution, in September 1781, County Lieutenant
Thomas Newton wrote Governor Nelson that Princess Anne “has neither
civil nor military law in it,” so that “Murder is committed & no notice is
taken of it.” Some of Philips’s associates had managed to evade capture
139. Virginia Antiquary, 1:96 (Phillpot and Will); Journal of the House of Delegates of
the Commonwealth of Virginia; Begun [. . .] Monday, the Fifth Day of October, in the
Year of our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy-Eight (Richmond, 1827),
39, 55 (entries for November 2, 1778 and November 11, 1778); McIlwaine, Letters of the
Governors, 1:308; and Virginia Gazette (Dixon and Nicholson), March 26, 1779, 2
(Phillpot, Pinkerton, Miller, and Thornton sentenced).
140. Virginia Antiquary, 1:119. The discovery of this remarkable fact should be credited
to Adele Hast. Hast, Loyalism in Revolutionary Virginia, 98.
141. Slaves could not appeal a conviction for felony in a county court of oyer and
terminer, and had to hope for a gubernatorial pardon. Shepard, “The Administration of
Justice,” 21.
142. McIlwaine, Letters of the Governors, 1:300 (Philips’s transfer to Williamsburg in
July 1778); Virginia Gazette (Purdie), October 30, 1778, 3 (indictment); and “An endictment
against Josiah Philips for robbery,” October 20, 1778, Verdict, October 27, 1778, Judgment,
October 28, 1778, Report of Sentence, October 30, 1778, all in Wirt, Life of Patrick Henry,
465–68. The records of the General Court were burned in the Civil War, but William Wirt
had copied them for inclusion in his biography of Henry. Wirt noted that the indictment was
“endorsed . . . in Mr. Randolph’s handwriting.” For a contemporaneous report of the sentence and execution, see Virginia Gazette (Dixon and Hunter), October 30, 1778; and
Virginia Gazette (Dixon and Hunter), December 4, 1778, 2.
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and continued to launch raids from the Great Dismal Swamp. Newton
reported that “a few desperate fellows go about on the sea Coasts and
large Swamps and do mischiefs in the nights.” Over time, however,
Newton was able to use the militia effectively against the bandits, who
were captured and charged in the county courts. A letter to the governor
1 year later was more hopeful. There were “[m]any refugees out in the
Swamps . . . anxious to come in,” he thought. A few of Philips’s old comrades, “Levi Sikes & Robt. Stewart,” were unlikely to reform, but if the
others were pardoned, “the whole nest would be broken up.”143
Consequents: Professionalization and the Fall of Legislative Law
If the act attainting Philips of treason was experienced by the gentlemen of
the General Assembly as an exercise of that body’s extraordinary legal
power, how did it come to stand, 10 years later, for a tyrannical violation
of rights? What accounts for the difference between experience and
memory?
Speaking to the convention considering a proposed federal Constitution
in 1788, Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph recalled the Philips affair,
describing how “a man had been deprived of his life” in a rushed proceeding, in which “vague reports” of his “committing several crimes” and “running at large” were brought to the House ﬂoor and a legislator had drawn
“from his pocket a bill ready written” to attaint him. Philips was “sentenced
to death,” Randolph announced, “without being confronted with his
accuser and witness; without the privilege of calling for evidence.”
Missing from Randolph’s account was Philips the “laborer”; missing
was the banditti of escaped slaves; murder and arson had become “several
crimes”; and the legislature’s deliberations had become a reliance on
“vague reports.” Omitted entirely was Philips’s jury trial on charges of robbery.144 Where did this view of the case come from?145
143. Thomas Newton Jr., to Thomas Nelson Jr., September 17, 1781, in Palmer, Calendar
of Virginia State Papers, 2:450–51 (“neither civil nor military law”); George, “Virginia
Loyalists,” 204; Shepard, “The Administration of Justice,” 79; and Thomas Newton to
Benjamin Harrison, August 9, 1782, in William P. Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia
State Papers and Other Manuscripts, vol. 3, January 1, 1782 to December 31, 1784
(Richmond, 1883), 252 (“the whole nest”).
144. Kaminsky and Saladino, Documentary History of the Ratiﬁcation, 9:972.
145. The convention returned to the subject of Philips repeatedly. Patrick Henry took up
the defense of Philips’s attainder but did not contest the essentials of Randolph’s account,
other than to insist that Philips was “a fugitive murderer and an outlaw.” Kaminsky and
Saladino, Documentary History of the Ratiﬁcation, 9:1038. Like Randolph, Henry failed
to mention the slaves in Philips’s gang, although slavery and the fear of slave insurrection
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Randolph was probably not being dishonest. As he knew, a number of
men in the audience were familiar with the case, in one way or another, and
might have advanced their cause by exposing his dishonesty. For Randolph
to have taken such a risk would have been reckless. Jefferson himself, whose
view of Randolph was typically lukewarm, did not think he had been
lying.146 Nor was Randolph misinformed; he had been personally involved
in bringing Philips to justice, both as clerk of the House of Delegates when
the bill of attainder was passed, and, later, as state attorney general when
Philips was prosecuted. Although it is possible that Randolph’s memory
failed (and, we must assume, that other delegates who knew of the case
were unable or unwilling to correct him), it seems more likely that his perspective on the event had changed. Patrick Henry had set the agenda at the
ratifying convention by arguing that the proposed federal Constitution would
deprive Virginians of the liberty that they had enjoyed under their own constitution. Henry had no faith that the “rope-dancing, chain rattling, ridiculous
ideal checks” Madison had implanted in the federal Constitution would constrain its government. In reality, an energetic, superior national government
would overwhelm the states and then absorb them.147 Randolph’s strategy
was to insist, against Henry, that Virginians’ liberty was already at risk.
Virginians were insecure, he argued, even under the state’s venerable
Declaration of Rights, because “a man” had been “sentenced to death” by
the General Assembly, acting merely on “vague reports” that he committed
“several crimes” and was now “running at large.” A federal Constitution
would secure liberty in Virginia by prohibiting these proceedings.148
Of course, Randolph enhanced the rhetorical value of the case by failing
to describe Philips or his gang of escaped slaves. But as we know, he was

featured centrally in arguments that Henry advanced against ratiﬁcation. Robin L. Einhorn,
“Patrick Henry’s Case against the Constitution: The Problem with Slavery,” Journal of the
Early Republic 22 (2002): 549–55. John Marshall, George Nicholas, and Edmund Pendleton
also addressed the Philips case, although none of them pressed Randolph on his description
or added signiﬁcant details. Kaminsky and Saladino, Documentary History of the
Ratiﬁcation, 9:1086, 1116, 1127, 1333; and John P. Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino,
eds., The Documentary History of the Ratiﬁcation of the Constitution, vol. 10, Virginia,
No. 3 (Madison, WI: Wisconsin Historical Society Press, 1993), 1197.
146. Matthew Steilen, “The Josiah Philips Attainder and the Institutional Structure of the
American Revolution,” Howard Law Journal 60 (2017): 434–42.
147. Kaminsky and Saladino, Documentary History of the Ratiﬁcation, 9:959; and
Pauline Maier, Ratiﬁcation: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787–1788 (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 2015), 257–60. For a recent account of the convention that treats
Randolph quite harshly, see Lori Glover, The Fate of the Revolution: Virginians Debate
the Constitution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2016), 110–14.
148. Kaminsky and Saladino, Documentary History of the Ratiﬁcation, 9:951–52.
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wise to omit these facts, because they almost surely would have obscured
his key point: that the gang never really posed a serious danger to the state.
If Philips was so dangerous, then why had he been caught by a voluntary
militia company? What need had there been, really, for the legislature’s
extraordinary intervention? The same skepticism is apparent in
Randolph’s account of the case in his History of Virginia, written in
1810 or thereabouts. If Philips’s crimes were so heinous and widely
known—if they were, in short, legally “notorious”—then why was he convicted of robbing twine and some felt hats? And if petty robbery could be
transformed on the House ﬂoor into a brigandage so great it that threatened
civil government itself, what offense could not? The success of ordinary
law and ordinary executive power gave the legal arguments on which
Jefferson and Henry had relied a kind of sophistic quality. Pivoting
between extraordinary and ordinary forms of law produced an impression
of the legislature’s arbitrary discretion, just as it did when local justices of
the peace pivoted from law to equity in an effort to resolve a case before
them. And where there was arbitrary discretion, passion and interest tended
to corrupt the exercise of power. For delegates at the convention hearing
this exchange, the concerns they knew from the long-running public debate
over reform of the county courts must have seemed, in a ﬂash, to apply to
the General Assembly as well.149
A worry had been growing about the character of the men seated in the
House of Delegates. As early as 1781, Jefferson was prepared to admit that
its members were neither a natural aristocracy nor under the inﬂuence of
elite lawyers to the degree that he had expected they would be. Because
no one could resist “proceedings [in] the form of an act of assembly,”
he conceded, the House had, “in many instances, decided rights which
should have been left to judiciary controversy.” Jefferson had been
wrong, then, to think assembled bodies of leading men the safest repository
of a power to settle boundaries between ordinary and extraordinary forms
of law. His 1783 draft of a state constitution accordingly banned bills of
attainder outright. Other Virginia elites saw the problem as well. Writing
in 1786, Ralph Wormeley worried about “[t]he crude state of politics in
this country.”150 A short time later, preparing for an opening address at
the constitutional convention in Philadelphia, James Madison devoted
the keenest of his complaints in “Vices of the Political System of the
149. Randolph, History of Virginia, 268–69; and Roeber, Faithful Magistrates, 104.
150. Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, 120; Jefferson’s Draft of a Constitution for
Virginia, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 6, 21 May 1781 to 1 March 1784, ed.
Julian P. Boyd (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1952), 298; and Ralph
Wormeley Letterbook (June 13, 1786), quoted in Roeber, Faithful Magistrates, 177.
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U.S.” to the vicissitudes, injustice, and low character of the state assemblies. Madison had just ﬁnished serving in the Virginia House of
Delegates, where he had been struggling to push through a reform of the
state’s court system.151
The movement to reform the county courts was tied up with clashing
conceptions of the practice of law in Virginia, conceptions we have been
tracing throughout this article. According to Alan McKinley Smith, “the
single factor most essential to the development of a legal profession in
Virginia was, of course, the court system.” This was because institutional
and cultural boundaries separated lawyers practicing in the state’s different
courts. In 1748, the General Assembly had barred attorneys practicing
before the central General Court from also practicing in the county courts,
acting on petition from one of the counties, but the principal effect was to
“create a legal elite” in Williamsburg. There the state’s “philosophical lawyers” embraced a movement toward liberal education that had distinguished elite English barristers. But others had little patience for these
embellishments. Writing from Bermuda, St. George Tucker’s father,
Henry, could not understand why his son insisted on taking courses in natural philosophy, moral philosophy, and mathematics, “an Academical education” unnecessary for the practice of law (and expensive, given William
& Mary’s tuition).152 Justices of the peace largely shared this attitude and
resisted efforts by the elite to export its methods to their courts. In 1779,
gentleman justices sitting in the House of Delegates had fought off a bill
that would have required them to purchase law books with fees levied
from litigants. The ideology of “country” opposition still had currency,
and from this perspective the professionalization and centralization of
the law was a source of corruption and a threat to liberty; liberty that
Virginia gentlemen had long preserved by independently administering
justice in the counties according to common sense, experience, and basic
151. “Vices of the Political System of the U.S.” (April 1787), in The Founders’
Constitution, vol. 1, ed. Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1987); and Mary Sarah Bilder, Madison’s Hand: Revising the
Constitutional Convention (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 35.
152. Henry Tucker to St. George Tucker, April 10, 1772, quoted in Smith, “Virginia
Lawyers, 1680–1776,” 39–40; Cullen, Tucker and Law in Virginia, 8–9; Smith, “Virginia
Lawyers,” 2, 302–3 (“create a legal elite,” “philosophical lawyers”); David Lemmings,
Professors of the Law: Barristers and English Legal Culture in the Eighteenth Century
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 17, 241–42; and Gerard W. Gawalt, The
Promise of Power: The Emergence of a Legal Profession in Massachusetts, 1760–1840
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), 4, 18–19. Both Lemmings and Gawalt show
that Americans working to professionalize the practice of law tended to adopt the English
ideal of the “good lawyer,” who was liberally educated, morally upright, and an “independent” gentleman.
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legal maxims. Eventually, reformers settled on a plan that had judges from
the central courts riding circuit throughout the state, with the hope of
improving the quality and speed of local justice and gradually displacing
county proceedings. The leading proposals for reform in the 1780s therefore called for assize courts or district courts staffed by General Court,
admiralty and chancery judges, possessed of a jurisdiction that trenched
deeply on the county court. (Tucker himself would soon ride circuit as a
General Court judge.)153 The aim was to create “the machinery . . . to
assure a rational, systematic law.” Were gentlemen justices who sat as
members of the House of Delegates to enjoy a power to interfere with
proceedings before these courts, however it would have precisely the opposite effect.154
With the argument for legislative jurisdiction over Philips stripped away,
what remained of the case was simply interference in the judicial process.
Henry and Jefferson were unbothered because they continued to credit the
argument that justiﬁed the attainder: the Philips gang had threatened government itself. At least initially, Jefferson was comfortable with extraordinary legislative jurisdiction in cases in which it was necessary to protect the
state, as the assembly would comprise the state’s greatest men and act
under the guidance of lawyers sitting there. But to others, less impressed
by Philips and perhaps by the assembly as well, the interference was intolerable. St. George Tucker, a lawyer by training but a gentleman planter
only by marriage, used his edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries to
fume about acts of attainder. They were, he wrote, “state-engines of
oppression in the last resort,” characterized by a “want of legal forms,
legal evidence, and every other barrier which the laws provide against tyranny and injustice in ordinary cases.” Ordinary cases, Tucker thought,
adjudicated in courts of law, would be decided according to legal forms
that gave forensics a greater precision. The movement to professionalize
the practice of law drew strength from a number of sources, but a desire
153. Roeber, Faithful Magistrates, 113, 160–202; and Miller, Juries and Judges, 5–11,
24–26. On Tucker’s tenure as a General Court judge, see Charles F. Hobson, “St. George
Tucker: Judge, Legal Scholar, and Reformer of Virginia Law,” in Billings and Tarter,
“Esteemed Bookes of Lawe”, 198–99, 212–13. Although he did ride circuit, Tucker had initially favored the creation of locally staffed intermediate courts, presumably because such a
system would better preserve local control. George Wythe to St. George Tucker, October 10,
1784, Wolf Law Library, William & Mary School of Law, http://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php/Wythe_to_St._George_Tucker,_10_October_1784 (last accessed February
22, 2019).
154. Miller, Juries and Judges, 25 (“machinery”). On the effect district courts had on
Virginia legal culture and the county courts, see Cullen, Tucker and Law in Virginia, 83–
84; and Charles F. Hobson, ed., St. George Tucker’s Law Reports and Selected Papers,
1782–1825 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 36.
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to render law more scientiﬁc and thereby narrow judicial discretion was
repeated and found an audience among lawyers and merchants in
Williamsburg and Richmond. Blackstone’s Commentaries, with its rational, “institutional” methodology and clear legal principles, was their preferred law book.155
To secure the beneﬁts of professionalized law required a means of insulating courts from arbitrary interference by the assembly. A superior
national government, whose Constitution forbade state bills of attainder
and ex post facto laws, was one such mechanism. Another was a judicially
enforceable boundary between the assembly and courts of law. Once legal
proceedings in the assembly were stripped of their lawyerly defenses, they
took on the appearance of an abuse of lawmaking power, of arbitrary or
factional expressions of will. St. George Tucker again pointed the way.
Josiah Philips, he wrote, had been saved by the brave refusal of judges
of the General Court to execute the sentence of death mandated by the
act of attainder. The court “refused to pass the sentence,” insisting instead
that Philips “be put upon his trial, according to the ordinary course of law.”
The episode was, he thought, “decisive proof of the separation of powers,
and of the independency of the judiciary.” At the time Tucker was writing,
judicial independence was “in the air,” as judges sitting on the state’s constitutionally established courts sought to defend their jurisdiction from
what they argued were unconstitutional legislative alterations.156
Tucker claimed that the General Court had invalidated the act of attainder by judicial review. Commentators have long expressed skepticism that
the General Court did in fact refuse to comply, because Philips was captured before the end of the attainder’s grace period and therefore could
not have been, consistent with its terms, executed on its sentence.157 Yet
we can still account for much of Tucker’s view if we attenuate, slightly,
his version of events; perhaps, in informal conversation with Attorney
General Randolph, judges expressed skepticism that Philips’s crimes
could legally constitute treason, as the act of attainder alleged.158
155. Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries, 292–93; Michael Lobban, The Common Law
and English Jurisprudence, 1760–1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991),
57–61; and Cullen, Tucker and Law in Virginia, 127–30.
156. Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries, 293. The struggle between the General
Assembly and the judges of the Court of Appeals had already resulted in the
“Remonstrance of 1788,” and would again be at issue in the case of Kamper v. Hawkins
(1794). Cullen, Tucker and Law in Virginia, 80–94; and Hamburger, Law and Judicial
Duty, 559–74.
157. Jesse Turner, “A Phantom Precedent,” American Law Review 48 (1914): 322–23;
W. P. Trent, “The Case of Josiah Philips,” American Historical Review 1 (1896): 451.
158. Steilen, “Josiah Philips Attainder,” 444–45.
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Whether or not Tucker was correct about the details, his framing of the
case prepared law students to envision a new role for courts of law: policing the boundaries between “legislative” and “judicial” functions. In drawing that line, courts and lawyers would now decide when a matter was
appropriately resolved by the ordinary course of law and when it was ﬁt
for determination in the legislative or executive branches.159 Judges
would construct a doctrine that kept each branch in its proper sphere, preserving for themselves a class of decisions that required “due process.” The
old vision of plural regimes of law, including an extraordinary body of legislative law for doing justice in cases of civil conﬂict, was giving way to a
judicial doctrine of separation of powers.
***
These changes did not occur solely in Virginia, although they occurred at
different rates in different places, and were forced even to retreat in some
states by the advance of Jeffersonian Republicans in the state legislature.160
But, generally speaking, the “cosmopolitan elites” who defended loyalists
from charges of treason during the Revolution and who led efforts to
reclaim their property afterwards, and who emerged as some of the most
vigorous public advocates of the practice of judicial review, also placed
bills of attainder and ex post facto laws at the center of their persuasive
efforts. The federal Constitution’s prohibition of bills of attainder was,
wrote Alexander Hamilton as Publius, one of those “speciﬁc exceptions
to legislative authority” that could “be preserved in practice no other
way than through the medium of the courts.” Bills of attainder, observed
James Wilson in his Lectures on Law, were simply “legislative verdicts.”
They were arbitrary exercises of legislative power. No trace remained in
either commentary of the legislature’s authority to adjudicate notorious
cases, despite the revolutionary practices of both Hamilton’s New York
and Wilson’s Pennsylvania, whose governments together attainted hundreds of American loyalists and British subjects.161 By 1795, William
159. Gerald Leonard, “Jefferson’s Constitutions,” in Constitutions and the Classics:
Patterns of Constitutional Thought from Fortescue to Bentham, ed. Denis Galligan
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 376–78; and David Thomas Konig, Nature’s
Advocate: Thomas Jefferson and the Republic of Law (forthcoming), ch. 4.
160. Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 425–32; and John Phillip Reid, Controlling the
Law: Legal Politics in Early National New Hampshire (Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois
University Press, 2004).
161. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, “A Discrete and Cosmopolitan Minority: The Loyalists, The
Atlantic World, and the Origins of Judicial Review,” Chicago-Kent Law Review 81
(2006): 835–38; Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed., No. 78, The Federalist (Cambridge, MA:
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Paterson of New Jersey (whose state had also conﬁscated the land of loyalists during the Revolution), now a justice of the United States Supreme
Court, rejected the argument of counsel in Vanhorne’s Lessee
v. Dorrance that legislatures had a power “on certain emergencies” to
seize the lands of one person and vest them in another. To Paterson’s
mind, this sort of thing had to be done in court. In court, “proofs and allegations” would be heard by a jury; but in the legislature, wrote Paterson,
“[t]he proprietor stands afar off, a solitary and unprotected member of
the community, and is stript off his property, without his consent, without
a hearing, without notice, [and] without his participation, or the intervention of a jury.” One can almost imagine Philips, “standing afar off,” hiding
somewhere in the Great Dismal Swamp, unaware that his life was at stake
in the Virginia House of Delegates.162
If Philips appeared too early to beneﬁt from an emerging practice of
judicial review and separation of powers, there was no such temporal
irony for Will, Sandy, and Bob. Slave fear, and the domestic law of slavery
that justices applied to enslaved persons, would of course remain intact in
Virginia for many years to come.163 And on this front there was little help
from “cosmopolitans” such as St. George Tucker, who, while professing to
detest slavery and employing judicial review to check the actions of
Virginia planters sitting in the General Assembly, eventually sided with
these same men on the subject of slavery, on the grounds, in the words
of one historian, that “blacks were incapable of freedom and happiest
under the benign rule of their paternalistic masters.”164 Enslaved men
and women were excepted even from the beneﬁts of Virginia’s constitutional law. Writing in 1806, Judge Tucker of the Virginia Court of
Appeals squinted at the soaring language of the state’s Declaration of
Rights that “freedom is the birth-right of every human being,” remarking
that it had been “notoriously framed with a cautious eye to this subject,
and was meant to embrace the case of free citizens, or aliens only; and
not by a side wind . . . to give freedom to those very people whom we
have been compelled from imperious circumstances to retain, generally,
Harvard University Press, 1961), 429; James Wilson, Lectures on Law, Part II, Lecture VI
(1790), in The Works of James Wilson, vol. 2, ed. Robert Green McCloskey (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 548; and Steilen, “Bills of Attainder,” 826–89 (attainder in revolutionary New York and Pennsylvania).
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163. Schwarz, Twice Condemned, chap. 8.
164. Taylor, Internal Enemy, 107.

538

Law and History Review, May 2019

in the same state of bondage that they were in at the revolution.” For judgment of Tucker on this point we can quote his own words, written a decade
earlier in his Dissertation on Slavery, concerning just such an about-face:
“[T]hat a people who have declared, ‘That all men are by nature equally
free and independent,’ and have made this declaration the ﬁrst article in
the foundation of their government, should in deﬁance of so sacred a
truth, recognized by themselves in so solemn a manner, . . . tolerate a practice incompatible therewith, is evidence of the weakness and inconsistency
of human nature.”165
A cruel legal plurality lived on for the enslaved.166
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